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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to examine what effect the United States policy towards militias 
in Iraq has on the security, stability and troop levels.  Conventional wisdom regarding the 
imperative to eliminate militias in Iraq rests upon the correct observation that the state is 
locked in a struggle over the legitimate use of force, and therefore over power and 
authority, with the militias, but fails to appreciate that the militia may have more popular 
legitimacy than the state.  Recognizing this calls for a reconsideration of policy responses 
to the militia phenomenon.  This thesis will argue that while military defeat is tactically 
feasible, it is unlikely to lead to strategic success because the militias have established 
popular legitimacy and military attacks by an occupying power are only likely to increase 
it.  For similar reasons, engagement of the militia is likely to be more efficacious.  The 
thesis will use two case studies to investigate which policy might work best for Security, 
Stability, Transition and Reconstruction operations in Iraq.  A comparison is adopted to 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of defeat and engagement as alternative military 
strategies employ by an occupying power vis-à-vis indigenous militia forces in the 
Middle East.  The first case study is the United States occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 
2007.  The second case study is the British occupation of Palestine from 1920 to 1948.  
The thesis will conclude with an analysis of similarities between each case, potential 
policy prescription for the U.S., avenues for future research and some comments on the 
semantics of words. 
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Many different organizations have resisted coalition forces passively and actively 
since the beginning of the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2003.  These groups include Iraqi 
nationalist parties, regional and global insurgent organizations, transnational criminal 
groups and local criminal gangs, and sectarian militias. Although these organizations 
have highly diverse goals and objectives, the tendency to lump them together as 
“terrorists” undermines the ability of policy makers to respond to each appropriately.  
Some of these organizations, such as Al Qaeda and Ansar al Sunnah, have a clear and 
unwavering commitment to the destruction of the Iraqi government and the U.S. led 
Coalition.  On the other hand, Shia militias, most notably the Mahdi Militia and the Badr 
Corps, have much more complex strategies.  Militias sometimes cooperate with the Iraqi 
government and coalition forces, at other times challenge them politically, and at still 
other times resist them violently. Political factions supported by militias are currently 
participating in the Iraqi government.  These unclear and mixed signals have left coalition 
forces in a quandary about how to respond effectively to the challenge presented by Iraqi 
militias.  Over the course of the occupation Coalition policy on the Shia militias has 
varied from kinetic military action to voluntary disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration, to indirect support for Iraqi government policies to abolish them legally.   
In terms of military strategy, a “one size fits all” counterinsurgency strategy, 
involving the elimination or destruction of the enemy, has been implemented with a view 
toward achieving short term success.  Yet as retired United States Marine Corps General 
Charles C. Krulak once said: “Bullets help sanitize an operational area, they don’t win a 
war.”1 A key component in establishing an effective military policy in Iraq will be to 
understand the different types of resistance organizations that operate in a military 
commander’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).  There is a consensus in both policy and 
strategy discussions that Shia militias must be eliminated if a stable and democratic state 
                                                 
1  Quoted in McFate, Montgomery and Jackson, Andrea V., “The Object Beyond War: 
Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition,” Military Review, The Professional 
Journal of the U.S. Army LXXXVI, January-February (2006): 61. 
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are to be established, but there has been little investigation of the foundations of this 
consensus.  This thesis seeks to question this consensus through a comparative 
investigation of the effects of alternative strategies toward militia forces in Iraq and 
elsewhere.   
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since 2004, U.S. policy makers, military leaders and academics have all argued 
that a policy of elimination of militias was needed for Iraq to achieve stability.  In April 
2004, a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) official announced: “Our objective is the 
complete elimination of militias.”2  Another Coalition official stated that same month that 
“no state can exist in which sub-national entities are allowed to have their own private 
armies or armed forces.”3  In June 2004, the CPA announced the “successful completion 
of negotiations on the nationwide transition and reintegration of militias…previously 
outside state control.”4  This policy officially considered any armed force that remained 
outside of state control illegal, and committed the Coalition to dealing with them harshly. 
Beehner, a specialist on Iraq, acknowledges numerous requests made by the U.S. for the 
Iraqi government to eliminate militias, even though in some cases they were known to 
serve as part of the security apparatus.5  The consensus that the militia must be eliminated 
for stability to be established is shared by academic analysts.  Mowle, Diamond, 
Schwarz, Hashim, and Schultz et al., all argue that defeating militias is the only way that 
U.S. forces can succeed in Iraq.6   
                                                 
2  Hashim, 300. 
3  Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 300-301. 
4  “Armed Forces and Militia Agreement Announced,” in Coalition Provisional Authority [database 
online]. Baghdad, Iraq, June 5, 2004 [cited News Release].  Available June 2004 from 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040604a_MNFI.html (accessed March 30, 2007). 
5  “Iraq: Militia Groups,” in Council on Foreign Relations [database online]. Washington, D.C., June 9, 
2005 [cited 2007].  Available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/8175/ (accessed April 28, 2007). 
6  Richard H. Schulz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security 
Policy” (Ph.D. diss., United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, 2004), 1-89.; Thomas 
Mowle, “Iraq’s Militia Problem,” Survival 48, no. 3 (2006): 41-58.; Larry Diamond, “Iraq and Democracy: 
The Lessons Learned,” Current History 105, no. 687 (2006): 34.; Anthony Schwarz, “Iraq’s Militias: The 
True Threat to Coalition Success in Iraq,” Parameters (Spring 2007): 55-71; Hashim, Insurgency and 
Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 482. 
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However, this consensus rests upon a partial understanding of the role of the 
militias in Iraqi society.  Mowle’s description of militias as “death squads, ethnic 
cleansers, and religious thugs” overemphasizes the negative aspects of Shia militias and 
ignores their defensive activities and popular legitimacy.7  Schultz makes no distinction 
between insurgents, terrorists, militias, and criminal organizations as armed groups “that 
will continue to pose serious and increasingly dangerous security challenges to states.”8  
Diamond maintains that militias only serve as “armed groups controlled by political 
parties and political movements [that] use this private force to aggrandize their power, 
intimidate voters, and create an undemocratic playing field.”9  Schwarz states that 
militias pose the greatest threat to coalition success because they “weaken government 
influence by providing unofficial (and effective) security in localized areas using illegal 
methods.” 10 Despite explicitly recognizing that militias are considered “legitimate 
entities acting morally in the absence of effective national, provincial or local security 
institutions,” he too insists upon their elimination.11  Hashim states that “militias are 
among the greatest obstacles to political stability and economic reconstruction in 
societies trying to recover from conflict or seeking to prevent a descent into incipient 
civil war.”12  This conclusion is based on the assumption of a fully functioning 
government with a cohesive professional military that can defeat the insurgency in Iraq, 
allowing U.S. forces to establish a smaller occupational footprint. 
Predictably, the policy of integrating the militia into the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF) and/or eliminating them has failed on both counts.  In August 2005, Major General 
Douglas Lute, the Director of Operations for Iraq and Afghanistan for United States 
Central Command stated that militias remained “an obstacle to the achievement of 
                                                 
7  Thomas Mowle, “Iraq’s Militia Problem,” Survival 48, no. 3 (2006): 41. 
8  Richard H. Schulz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, “Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security 
Policy” (Ph.D. diss., United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, 2004), 73. 
9  Larry Diamond, “Iraq and Democracy: The Lessons Learned,” Current History 105, no. 687 (2006): 
38. 
10  Anthony Schwarz, “Iraq’s Militias: The True Threat to Coalition Success in Iraq,” Parameters 
(Spring 2007): 55-56, 57-58. 
11 Schwarz, 58. 
12  Hashim, 300. 
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‘ultimate peace’ in Iraq,” and would have to be eliminated if the Iraqi government were 
to maintain control.13   Meanwhile, Middle East specialist Kenneth Katzman observed 
that “the ISF is not a true national force but rather a[n ineffective] carved-up 
conglomeration of militias.”14  In September 2007, an independently commissioned 
report submitted to Congress by retired Marine Corps General James Jones called for the 
immediate dissolution of the Iraqi Police Service due to the conflicting loyalties of 
members of different militias that joined after the fall of Saddam.15  That same month the 
U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) published Congressional Report GAO-07-
1195 detailing the status of 18 benchmarks established by the U.S. government to 
measure legislative, economic and security progress in Iraq.  Of the eighteen benchmarks, 
two pertained to the elimination of Shia militias.  Benchmark seven called for 
implementation of strong legislative policies for militia disarmament, while benchmark 
thirteen was designed to eliminate militia control of local security.  Neither benchmark 
had been met.  Additionally, benchmark twelve, which focused on the elimination of safe 
havens, was also considered a failure because the Sadr City area of Baghdad was 
functioning under the auspices of militia control.  This benchmark also considered select 
government ministries operating under militia control as a failure.  These benchmarks 
indicate that the basic approach of integration and defeat remains in place – and remains 
unsuccessful.  The U.S. has also recognized the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to 
eliminate militias.  In a Congressional Research Service Report written in November 
2006 by Middle East Specialist Kenneth Katzman, the option of conducting a “coup” to 
remove the Maliki, who has been indifferent towards the existence of Shia militias, was 
listed as a possible strategy to eliminate Shia militias.  This seemed to confirm the fears  
 
 
                                                 
13  Jones, 302. 
14  “Shiite Militias and Iraq’s Security Forces,” in Council on Foreign Relations [database online]. 
New York, NY November 30, 2005 [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9316/shiite_militias_and_iraqs_security_forces.html (accessed February 21, 
2007). 
15  James L. Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies : Independent Commission on the 
Security Forces of Iraq, 2007), 152. 
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of many Iraqis that the “United States might try to use its influence among Iraqis to force 
Maliki to resign and replace him with a military strongman or some other figure that 
would crack down on sectarian militias.”16    
B. HYPOTHESIS 
This policy failure flows from the flawed understanding of the militias in 
academic and policymaking circles.  Conventional wisdom regarding the imperative to 
eliminate militias in Iraq rests upon the correct observation that the state is locked in a 
struggle over the legitimate use of force, and therefore over power and authority, with the 
militias, but fails to appreciate that the militia may have more popular legitimacy than the 
state.17  Recognizing this calls for a reconsideration of policy responses to the militia 
phenomenon.  This thesis will argue that while military defeat is tactically feasible, it is 
unlikely to lead to strategic success because the militias have established popular 
legitimacy and military attacks by an occupying power are only likely to increase it.  For 
similar reasons, engagement of the militia is likely to be more efficacious.  Militias have 
demonstrated an ability to protect their neighborhoods and provide basic services and this 
mutual dependence is unlikely to be overcome in the short term.  Therefore a U.S. policy 
of accommodation is likely to increase the likelihood of military success and political 
stability.18   
In much of the developing world weak states cannot consistently make and 
implement the authoritative rules of the game for society.  State leaders’ efforts to do so 
are contested by local strongmen, who offer people alternative “strategies of survival.”  
Strongmen and state leaders engage in a struggle for power, or to decide who will make 
the rules for society. Although state leaders and local strongmen are fundamentally 
                                                 
16  Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 
2004), 47. 
17  Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament:  State Making, Regional Conflict, and 
The International System (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1995), 216.; Joel S. Midgal, Strong 
Societies and Weak States (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 296.; Peter B. Evans, 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing The State Back In (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 390. 
18 This is not a fundamental shift in U.S. policy.  Strategies of engagement are used with the Kurdish 
Peshmerga in Northern Iraq and with Sunni Militias in Western Iraq. 
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locked in a battle for control, they very often become mutually interdependent.  Local 
strongmen need state resources to maintain their own support bases, but state leaders 
need support from the local strongmen if their policies are to be implemented.  Thus 
those in the strongest position to challenge the state’s authority are often also close allies 
of state authorities.19  Maliki is dependent on the strongmen who lead Shia militias 
because of the sway they hold over the population.  The struggles of strongmen that use 
militias to gain greater authority in Iraq raise several questions. What exactly is a militia?  
How do militias offer people the elements of a strategy of survival that is more attractive 
than what the state can offer and thus establish popular support, compliance and even 
legitimacy? Who are their constituents, and what are their motives?   
Shia militias in Iraq are “quasi-official paramilitary units formed … by forces 
loosely allied to the government.”20  They are “small, homegrown, paramilitary-style 
brigades being formed by local tribes, religious leaders and political parties,” which 
provide security to the local populace. 21  “[S]ome battle Iraq’s largely Sunni insurgency 
alongside official Interior and Defense ministry troops; others operate without official 
assistance or sanction.”22  Militias have earned acceptance and legitimacy through 
                                                 
19  Migdal, 296. 
20  Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 299.  Bradley Tatar, “Emergence of Nationalist Identity in Armed Insurrections: A Comparison of 
Iraq and Nicaragua,” Anthropological Quarterly 78, no. 1 (2005): 179; citing Lenin on 181.  Charles Tilly, 
“Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,” Sociological Theory 22, no. 1, Theories of Terrorism: A Symposium 
(2004): 11; Charles Tilly, “Terror as a Strategy and Relational Process,” International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology 46 (April-May 2005): 25.  The Encarta Dictionary gives three, defining militias as 
“soldiers who are civilians; an army of soldiers who are civilians but take military training and can serve 
full time during emergencies,” and as a “reserve military force; a reserve army that is not part of the regular 
armed forces but that can be called up in an emergency.”  The third definition is most relevant: 
“unauthorized quasi military group; an unauthorized group of people who arm themselves and conduct 
quasi-military training.”  Other definitions of the term militia include Tartar defining militias as “a fighting 
force that has no loyalty to a state, in contrast to armies or police, which are controlled by a government,” 
adding that V. I. Lenin had defined a civilian militia as a “self-acting, armed organization of the 
population.”  Tilly calls them “anti-governmental [groups that] maintain enduring organizations of coercive 
specialists and exercise terror within their base territories.” 
21  “Iraq: Militia Groups,” in Council on Foreign Relations [database online]. Washington D.C. June 9, 
2005 [cited 2007].  Available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/8175/.  In the view of this thesis, 
legitimacy from Iraq’s government is the primary causal factor that makes militias the most powerful force 
in Iraq.  Why should a militia disarm and dissolve if they are officially or unofficially recognized by the 
ruling political party, especially since it is possible that disarming might create more negative long term 
consequences?  
22“Iraq: Militia Groups. 
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defense of local families, tribes, and clans that have historically been victims of 
discrimination and persecution in Iraq.  This makes them fundamentally different from 
insurgencies and criminal organizations.  After the invasion in 2003 U.S. military units 
were incapable of establishing a presence everywhere, and Shia militias were employed 
to “organize security, suppress looting and restore basic services.”23  They emerged at a 
time when the local populace lacked state services and established regional peace and 
stability by negotiating with representative at the provincial level responsible for 
implementing state rule. 24 This led to accommodation between the militias and those 
charged with implementing state policy.25  Not only do militias provide a level of social 
stability, economic support to the community, and security for local neighborhoods, they 
also provide incentives for the local population to join the militia, thus cementing their 
position in Shia society.  According to Crenshaw, “incentives [include] a variety of 
individual needs: to belong to a group, to acquire social status, and reputation, to find 
comradeship or excitement, or to gain material benefits.”26  
Thus, militias aspire to regional political autonomy in order to acquire national 
power.  Unlike criminals and insurgents, militias mobilize the local populace through 
tribal, family, and religious ties that were developed over generations, through their 
acceptance as a quasi-official group that is loosely allied with the state and their ability to 
serve as protectors of the local population when battling an occupation force.  They are 
imbued with a certain level of legitimacy both by the people and by the current 
                                                 
23  “Behind Iraq’s Moqtada Intifada,” in Time Incorporated [database online]. New York, New York 
April 5, 2004 [cited 2007].  Available from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,608113,00.html 
(accessed March 5, 2007). 
24  Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division? 
1sted. (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 127, 133, 135.  Historically they have served an 
important purpose of defense against internal threats and external threats.  Internal threats include the Baath 
party that systematically marginalized the Shia population through executions, imprisonment, torture, and 
censorship of fundamental religious ideology.  During the late 1980’s the Shia militia’s prevented 
government forces from entering the Shia slum of Sadr City (formerly known as Saddam City) which 
facilitated the idea of opposition towards the minority-ruling Baath party.  Shia militias have also served as 
protection from external threats such as the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s and as far back as 
the colonial occupation of the British in the 1920s. 
25  Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in 
The Third World, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 88-92. 
26  Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context, (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1995), 19. 
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government in Iraq.  Their popular legitimacy has three bases.  First obligations derived 
from customs, values, and organization of the tribal system.  This system is what 
dominates daily life.  Loyalty to the “family and tribe is what dominates Iraq’s social and 
political life.”27  This facilitates the second element of legitimacy: the ability to provide 
security and basic services to the population at a local level.28  These elements are  
reinforced by external threats, especially those emanating from a military occupation.  
This has obvious implications for the U.S. military’s “one size fits all” counterinsurgency 
policy.29   
                                                 
27  Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of 
Contemporary Combat, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 203.  Militias are comprised of 
families and tribes who have greater influence on defining legitimacy in Iraqi society.   The tribe “signifies 
an ensemble of individuals and groups speaking the same language and dialect, split into multiple sub-
groups” that consist of clans, sub-clans and families.  Intertwined in the tribal system in Iraq consists of the 
Arab culture and Islamic religions that serves as the glue which has produced one of the world’s most 
fascinating civilizations.  From these tribes in the Iraqi Shia community is where the militia evolved. 
28  “Shiites Want the Help of Sadr’s Militia,” in Los Angeles Times [database online]. Los Angeles 
March 13, 2007 [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://fairuse.100webcustomers.com/fairenough/latimes888.html.; “Shiite Militias May be Tougher to 
Overcome,” in USA Today [database online]. New York September 7, 2007 [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-09-06-iraqmilitia_N.htm. For example, The Los Angeles 
Times reported in March of 2007 that many residents demanded that the Mahdi Militia to return to the 
street after being instructed to stand down in previous weeks.  Many Shia residents of Baghdad shared the 
same sentiment as Abu Fatima Sadi who said, “When the al Mahdi army was providing protection, there 
were no violations.”  USA Today reporters Oren Dorrell and Jim Michaels stated that “unlike al-Qaeda, 
which alienated people with its strict interpretation of Islam and intimidation of locals, militias became 
popular in some neighborhoods by offering Shiites protection Iraqi security forces couldn’t provide, 
particularly during intense sectarian fighting last year.”  After a recent car bomb that exploded in a busy 
Shia neighborhood, a junior Army officer observed how militia members were the first to move into a 
partially collapsed building and risk their own lives to rescue the injured and extract the dead.  “They were 
saving lives”, stated the U.S. Army platoon leader.  Only recently has a minority of senior military officials 
publicly legitimized their existence.  U.S. Army Colonel Rich Welch, a tribal specialist and senior military 
advisor for the U.S. Army Third Infantry Division compares them with historical American militia forces.  
“There a little bit like the Minutemen were for us in the Revolutionary War.  They get a call to arms and 
they are made up of regular citizens.” 
29  Bradley Tatar, “Emergence of Nationalist Identity in Armed Insurrections: A Comparison of Iraq 
and Nicaragua,” Anthropological Quarterly 78, no. 1 (2005): 185. Tartar provides a telling comparison 
between the task organization of a 1978-1979 Nicaraguan insurrection and the militia uprising that began in 
Iraq in 2003. A Nicaraguan militia commander leader explained the basic organization of a local militia in 
order to demonstrate the effectiveness and importance of their proliferation at the local level.  This basic 
understanding of militia design helps reinforce the need for state and military organizations negotiate with 
the local strongmen (militia leaders) relationship between the militia leadership and the rank-and-file 
population today in Iraq:  “You form your combat squadrons with the people who are the most experienced 
and the most trustworthy.  They, in turn form militia groups.  Normally, someone from the combat 
squadrons is the boss of a militia group…This was done by neighborhood.  For example, in one 
neighborhood you had ten combat squadrons, and you had ten militia squadrons.  Ten armed [squadrons] 
squadrons, not all of them armed, but yes, all had military training.  The militias did not have training.  
That’s how people are brought into combat.  A lot of young people, a lot of workers join up for combat.  
The elderly, women, they perform other tasks.” 
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In practice, the U.S. has extensive experience with engaging militias in Iraq.  It 
has long cooperated with Kurdish militias, such as the Peshmerga, which are supportive 
of both the Coalition presence and the Iraqi government.  More significantly perhaps, the 
U.S. has also engaged Sunni militias since September 2006, when the Sunni militias 
broke ties with Al Qaeda and joined forces with the U.S. to defeat it.  A revised policy 
with respect to the Shia militias could build upon this experience.  The most significant 
difference among the militias in the three areas of Iraq is simply the structure of their 
political alliances.  The Kurdish militias have worked closely with the U.S. and the Iraqi 
government, while the Sunni militias have worked increasing closely with the U.S. while 
maintaining their distance from the Shia-dominated government, and the Shia militias 
have cooperated more closely with the Iraqi government than with the United States.  As 
a result, Shia militia tend to be perceived as “extremist,” while Kurdish and Sunni militia 
are perceived as allies, if only allies of convenience in the latter case.  For example, 
Walter Slocombe, former Director of Security Affairs for the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), states:  
Shia extremists, centered around Moqtada al-Sadr, have stood ready to 
challenge the moderate Shia leadership and periodically, carry out violent 
attacks on Coalition personnel…this groups seeks to mobilize Shia 
resentment, to displace the traditional leadership and any possibility of 
power sharing or respect for minority rights.  The critical determinant will 
not be the immediate tactical success of the Coalition forces in fighting 
Sadr’s militia, but the willingness and ability of the established Shia 
leadership to maintain its position and stand up to the extremists….They 
must be defeated if political and social objectives are to be attained.30 
The question begs itself:  Is everyone affiliated with a Shia militia an extremist?    
Implying that Shia militias are by definition extremists risks alienating the large portion 
of the Shia population that sees militias as a source of security, governance, and local 
support.  Even when militias are “extremist,” many in the Shia population can be  
 
 
                                                 
30  W. B. Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire,’” Bryden and 
Hänggi (2004): 7-8. 
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expected to support them, actively or passively, so long as they provide defense for Shia 
Iraqis from further prosecution from Sunni insurgents, former regime elements and Baath 
party members.31 
Politics as defined by Bard O’Neil is the “process of making and executing 
binding decisions for society.”32  Understanding the political importance of militia 
objectives in a weak state that is occupied by a foreign military force will contribute to 
identifying feasible policy responses to them in the search for long term peace.  Militias 
embroil themselves in protracted low-level conflict because they believe they can achieve 
a successful political outcome.  Galula states that “all wars are theoretically fought for a 
political purpose.”33  Why do these militia’s focus primarily on the political outcome?  It 
gives the militia the advantage to compete with a larger conventional military force that is 
designed to defeat an inferior opponent.  It will also give them a regional advantage with 
maintaining control long after the occupying force have disappeared and when 
survivability of the group becomes an important factor.  Whoever controls the population 
will win the struggle.34  This has been true of the Mahdi Militias’ objectives since the 
inception of U.S. forces in Iraq.  Although their means of achieving victory have changed 
since 2003, the drive for political power has remained the same.35 The nature of the 
militia’s political agenda bestows upon them a strategic advantage against an occupation 
force.  Unlike an insurgency, a militia has the best of both worlds.  They are replete with 
support of the local populace whereas an insurgency might have to choose between 
                                                 
31  Shultz and Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, 239.  
Passive support by the general population is more common.  It allows for the continued execution of 
extremist activities without direct involvement.  For example, if an extremist group is the only group 
providing security to a particular neighborhood but enforcing other rules unacceptable by the state, then the 
local population is less inclined to make changes since it will further jeopardize their family’s security. 
Active support involves activities such as providing financial assets, training, manpower, technical 
expertise, weapons, materiel, medical, food, etc. in order to positively influence their success.   
32  Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd , revised ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 15. 
33  Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice, 4. 
34  Galula, 4-5. 
35  “Why Iraq Hangs in the Balance,” in Time Incorporated [database online]. New York, New York 
April 7, 2004 [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,608946,00.html.; “Behind Iraq’s Moqtada Intifada,” in 
Time Incorporated [database online]. New York, New York April 5, 2004 [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,608113,00.html (accessed March 5, 2007). 
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consensus and coercion.  Even if the population does not support them politically, they 
“may still support them materially in exchange for the security that militias offer.”36   
The need for a protracted conflict also benefits the militia in terms of expense, flexibility, 
competing ideologies, and propaganda when competing with a large force.37 Given the 
specific nature of militias, is a military strategy of defeat or engagement more likely to 
succeed in establishing security and stability?  The remainder of this thesis seeks to 
answer this question. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The thesis will use two case studies to investigate which policy might work best 
for Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction operations in Iraq.  A comparison is 
adopted to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of defeat and engagement as alternative 
military strategies employ by an occupying power vis-à-vis indigenous militia forces in 
the Middle East.  The first case study is the United States occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 
2007.  Chapter two analyzes the U.S. engagement strategies vis-à-vis the Kurdish 
Peshmerga in Northern Iraq since 2003, the defeat (2003-2006) and engagement (2006-
2007) strategies vis-à-vis the Sunni militias in western and central Iraq, and lastly, and 
the defeat strategies vis-à-vis the Shia militias in Baghdad and Southern Iraq.  The second 
case study is the British occupation of Palestine from 1920 to 1948.  Chapter three 
analyzes British strategies of passive acceptance (1930-1936), engagement (1936-1945) 
and defeat (1945-1948) vis-à-vis Jewish militias in Palestine.  Unlike Iraq, Palestine was 
not invaded by a foreign military to remove its leader.  Palestine was recognized as a 
British Trusteeship by the League of Nations after World War I, and British policy 
supported the World Zionist Organization’s goal of a Jewish state in Palestine.  Thus, the 
occupation forces initially faced a more permissive environment in Palestine.  However, 
in the years after 1936, the situation in Palestine came to resemble the current situation in 
Iraq in a number of important ways.  The Arab Palestinian insurgency against the 
                                                 
36  “Iraq as a Militia War,” in The Washington Institute for Near East Policy [database online]. 
Washington D.C. January 12, 2007 [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2551 (accessed March 5, 2007). 
37  Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice, 6-10. 
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politically dominant Jewish community and the British occupation force presented many 
of the same challenges the U.S. has faced in Iraq.  For the Jewish community of 
Palestine, as for the Shia community of Iraq, local security became an overriding 
concern, and local security came quickly to depend upon local Jewish militia forces as it 
became clear that the occupying military force was unable to provide security in the face 
of a growing Arab insurgency.  While the failure to provide a political solution that 
served the interests of the Palestinians as well as the Jews created a situation of 
permanent conflict in the greater Middle East region, the British occupation nevertheless 
left a strong state in its wake.  As Chapter III will show, this outcome had much to do 
with its military strategies vis-à-vis the militias.  The extent to which the lessons of the 
Palestine cases can be applied to the current situation in Iraq will be considered in 
Chapter IV.  The Palestine case study will rely primarily upon the abundant secondary 
sources, while the Iraq case study will rely largely on primary sources. 
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II. CASE STUDY- OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine three different strategies employed by U.S. military 
forces to deal with militias in Iraq since 2003, arguing that strategies of engagement have 
consistently been more effective than strategies of defeat.  As background, the first 
section describes the five phases of the United States invasion and occupation of Iraq 
between 2003 and 2007:  the invasion, evolution of insurgency, transfer of political 
authority, sectarian violence, and surge of U.S. forces.  The rest of chapter is divided into 
three, addressing U.S. strategies vis-à-vis militias in the majority Kurdish, Sunni, and 
Shia regions of Iraq, respectively.  The Kurdish section examines the U.S. Special Forces 
strategy of engagement with the Kurdish Peshmerga during the invasion of Iraq and 
during post conflict operations.  The analysis highlights the Special Forces perceived 
need to engage and cooperate with the Peshmerga in order to survive and ultimately 
succeed in defeating Saddam Hussein’s military.  The analysis will also examine the 
emergency direct employment of Kurdish militias during the post-invasion phase and 
their effect on security and stability when the majority of Iraq was mired in chaos. The 
third section provides a comparative analysis of two different strategies vis-à-vis militias 
in Sunni dominated Anbar province.  From 2003 to 2006, the U.S. battled insurgents and 
Al Qaeda in Anbar province, and insecurity remained high.  In mid-2006 a U.S. Army 
Brigade Commander reversed course, initiating a strategy of engagement with Sunni 
militias, ultimately endorsing their use for providing local security against al Qaeda 
threats, with the consequence of dramatically reduced levels of violence in the province. 
The last section examines U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Shia militias, focusing on the effects of 
the strategy of non-engagement with Moqtada al Sadr and his Mahdi Militia throughout 
the period under consideration. The chapter concludes with a comparative analysis of the 





Since 2003 the U.S. occupation of Iraq has taken a number of twists and turns, 
which has caused the U.S. military to react to situations on the ground rather than 
pursuing its intended mission of transitioning control to a democratically led Iraqi 
government.  The offensive strategy of preemptive strikes began on March 19, 2003 after 
a 48 hour deadline for Saddam Hussein to leave the country had passed.  By the next day, 
the U.S. campaign of “shock and awe” had devastated key infrastructure throughout the 
country and in Baghdad in particular.  Three weeks later Saddam’s government dissolved 
and the U.S. policy of “regime change,” in place since 1991, was finally achieved.  
Ironically, the Bush administration, which had criticized the “Clintonian policy of nation-
building in far-off places with unpronounceable names,” placed little emphasis on 
planning for the post-conflict reconstruction and security that would be needed to achieve 
success after the Baath party had fallen.38  On May 1, 2003 President Bush declared an 
end to combat operations.  Even though it was the end of the invasion, it was the 
beginning of an unconventional war, for which the military was not prepared.  Unlike 
previous unconventional campaigns such as Vietnam, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the 
number of non-state actors staking a claim in Iraq’s future was immense.  The United 
States military was faced with a growing insurgency campaign about which it understood 
very little.  Since most military commanders deployed to Iraq with the idea of conducting 
conventional combat operations, the military also gave little thought to post-conflict 
reconstruction and the civil-military operations that would be central to it.   
                                                 
38  Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, Or Division? 
1st ed. (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 99-100, 185, 




Figure 1.   Provincial Map of Iraq39 
 
The lack of focus on post-conflict operations was evident in the under-funded and 
under-equipped Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), led by 
retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, which was established to “manage postwar 
reconstruction, governance, and assistance in Iraq.”40  Created and funded by the 
Department of Defense in January 2003, ORHA was composed of Iraqi exiles and 
opponents of the Saddam Hussein regime.  It was intended to “re-establish law and order, 
basic services and some form of governance.”41  The tactical military strategy was to pass 
the torch of responsibility to civilian agencies that specialized in post-conflict operations, 
including OHRA and a newly elected Iraqi government.  Major General David Petraeus, 
commander of the 101st Airborne division who was responsible for most of Northern Iraq 
                                                 
39  John Pike, "Global Security.Org Maps of Iraq," Global Security, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/maps.htm (accessed January 4, 2008). 
40  Kirsten Lundberg, The Accidental Statesmen: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq 
(Cambridge, MA: Case Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,[2006]). 
41  Ahmed Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), 292. 
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stated that he “had a sense that ORHA, working together with Iraqi exiles and Iraqis who 
would be on the job, would probably take the lead” and that the U.S. military would assume 
more of a supporting role.42  However ORHA was able to accomplish little more than 
damage assessments as large areas of Iraq plummeted into chaos. ORHA had not prepared 
for the scenario that was playing out in Iraq and thus had no contingency plans ready to deal 
with such widespread looting, vandalism, and organized crime.  The 600-800 ORHA staff 
stationed in Baghdad was driven by competing political agendas, which led to sub par work 
and refusal to remove themselves from Saddam’s palaces and communicate with the local 
population.  ORHA’s “planning was ragged and execution was worse.”43  Personnel 
limitations and location also were a problem.  The ORHA North office was staffed by only 
ten personnel safely located in Irbil, in the Kurdish zone, which was too far away from other 
northern Iraqi cities such as Mosul, where reconstruction assistance was desperately 
needed.44  ORHA’s shortcomings were not all of its own making.  It had less than three 
months from its inception to plan and prepare for post-conflict nation-building whereas 
planning for post-conflict administration after World War II took two and a half years.45  In 
July 2003, ORHA was replaced with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by L. 
Paul Bremer, which was designed to “exercise executive, legislative, and judicial powers 
while rebuilding the state’s infrastructure and beginning the job of reconstruction.”46  On 
July 13, 2003, the CPA established the Interim Governing Council, an appointed body of 
Iraqis that was to “consult and advise [Bremer] on all matters relating to the temporary 
governance of Iraq.”47  However, by then reservations in Sunni and Shia communities about 
U.S. employment of what appeared to be a combat-oriented strategy in response to ORHA 
failures had begun to foment.  
 
                                                 
42  Lundberg, The Accidental Statesmen: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq, 7. 
43  Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, 294-295. 
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46  Hashim, 18. 
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Figure 2.   Coalition Provisional Authority Boundaries48 
 
After insurgents bombed United Nations Headquarters in Baghdad on August 19, 
2003 killing Sergio Vieira de Mello, one the best stabilization and reconstruction officials 
in the United Nations, the success of the initial invasion quickly gave way to a brewing 
Sunni insurgency and organized resistance by Shia militias.49  Many in the Sunni and 
Shia communities, initially slow to react as they waited to see whether U.S. forces would 
be liberators or occupiers, had decided by late 2003 to support the insurgency because of 
disappointment with the way the U.S. military treated Iraqi civilians, its inability to 
maintain order after the collapse of the Baath regime, the lack of economic improvement 
after the initial collapse caused by the invasion, the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, and the 
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U.S. inability to restore basic services.50  The Kurdish community in Northeast Iraq went 
the other way, maintaining a positive view of the Coalition, which supported its 
continued autonomy, and had eliminated the threat of the Baath party in the Kurdish 
north. The number of military operations increased as the insurgency grew and U.S. 
casualties mounted.  Hope that Saddam Hussein’s capture on December 13, 2003 would 
see an end to insurgent violence was quickly dashed, as simultaneous uprisings occurred 
throughout the country at the beginning of 2004. 
By spring 2004, the U.S. military had already experienced a bloody year in Iraq.   
Untrained and under-equipped Iraqi security forces failed to maintain security and 
sometimes encouraged insecurity, civilians working with coalition forces faced mass 
kidnappings and assassinations, and the U.S. military was confronted with graphic 
depictions of soldiers abusing prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison.  Additionally, the CPA 
was unable to fulfill demands for basic services, the Iraqi political process was 
encumbered with dissension, and the U.S. was no longer viewed as a liberator by Iraqi 
citizens.  April 2004 witnessed the Shia uprising led by Moqtada al-Sadr against U.S. and 
Iraqi security forces in Shia cities such as Kufa, Nasiriyah, Basra, and Sadr City.  During 
the same month, four private American contractors were murdered and horrifically 
mutilated in Fallujah, near the headquarters of the American-backed Iraqi Civil Defense 
Corps.  By the summer of 2004 the U.S. goal of creating a secular democracy had been 
replaced with an urgent need to avoid what Anthony Cordesman labeled a “serious 
strategic defeat.”51  In an effort to demonstrate Iraqi control, the CPA transferred 
authority to an interim Iraqi government under the control of Prime Minister Ayad 
Allawi, a leader appointed by the Coalition on June 28, 2004.  The second half of 2004 
witnessed gradual a shift in insurgent and extremist tactics of strictly focusing their 
attacks on Coalition forces towards attacking supporters of the transitional government.52  
Major military offensives began in September 2004 in Tal Afar (near Mosul), Samarra 
(north of Baghdad) and the Babil province south of Baghdad.  By November 8, 2004 the 
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U.S. military had launched one of the largest military offensives since the beginning of 
the invasion.  By December, the Coalition announced that over 15,000 insurgents had 
been killed or captured, while thousands of Iraqi security forces fighting alongside 
Coalition forces had also been killed or captured.53  However, many of the insurgent 
groups that emerged in 2004 led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in 
Iraq, now turned to sectarian attacks against the Shia community in an attempt to 
exacerbate instability.  The U.S. was able to manage the chaos long enough to allow 
elections to go forward at the beginning of 2005.   
The national elections, conducted on January 30, 2005, were intended to choose 
an interim government that would then draft a permanent constitution.  Sunni insurgent 
groups issued warnings to the populace not to participate, in hopes of undermining the 
legitimacy of the process.  This strategy backfired.  The Shia, who comprise sixty percent 
of the population, and the Kurds, who comprise seventeen percent, turned out in large 
numbers.  The Sunni, who comprises twenty percent of the population, did not participate 
in the election for two reasons.  First they felt that an election would lead to their 
marginalization by the majority Shia, and second the rejected the legitimacy of the U.S.-
backed process.  Shia political parties such as Dawa, the Supreme Council for Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and Moqtada al-Sadr’s United Iraqi Coalition collectively 
garnered a large percentage of the vote.  The Kurds were also successful, winning the 
second-largest percentage of the vote next to the Shia majority.  Most Iraqis had hoped 
the elections would lead to a respite from the escalating violence.54  However, sectarian 
divisions were further aggravated by a number of suicide bombings and terror attacks 
against the Shia population during the annual Ahura religious celebration in February.55  
By April 2005, the political process had slowed due to political wrangling and the 
inability to compromise between elected Sunni and Shia officials.   Attacks using vehicle 
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and human borne improvised explosive devices had risen to unprecedented levels 
following the announcement of the new government on April 28, 2005.56  Sunni 
insurgents, led by Zarqawi, continued to target both Coalition forces and Shia 
communities.  However, many senior Shia leaders showed restraint.  Adel Abdel-Mahdi, 
a senior SCIRI leader, insisted: “We are not going to raise our arms because we are 
attacked or because Zarqawi and others want to push us into civil war.”57  Instead, Shia 
militias sought to secure their neighborhoods from rising attacks.  However, the rise of 
the radical militants like Zarqawi and the military occupation helped promote a form of 
Shia extremism that was new to Iraq.  Certain elements of the Shia population became 
disenfranchised with U.S. promises of security, stability, improved economic conditions.  
This was then exacerbated by radical religious leaders promoting a theocratic Iranian 
style of rule.58  By 2006, Shia extremism was influenced more by sectarian attacks.  For 
example the destruction of al-Askari Mosque, the most revered Shia Shrine in Samarra on 
February 22, 2006 by Sunni insurgent is largely accepted as the point when Shia 
extremism was widely reflected by mass sectarian attacks against the Sunni population in 
retaliation for the bombing.59  After the bombing the ranks of Shia militias became 
diluted with people who joined with the sole intent of killing Sunnis for revenge.  The 
rise in extremists infiltrating and influencing militias can be attributed to the rise in 
sectarian attacks whereas before militias were more inclined to remain on the defensive.  
This rise in extremist infiltration also had an impact on Sadr’s ability to control his 
militias, culminating in his August 2007 call for a nationwide “six month freeze in 
hostilities to rein in lawless elements.”60 
By the summer of 2005, U.S. military emphasis had been placed on stifling the 
Sunni insurgency and limiting civilian attacks against Shia communities in hopes of 
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preventing an all out civil war.  Operation Matador, conducted in mid-May in western 
Iraq, targeted “suspected insurgent supply routes of volunteers and materiel from 
Syria.”61  In the context of sustained military operations, a referendum on the new Iraqi 
constitution was conducted and achieved the necessary two-thirds vote for approval, 
despite the fact that Sunnis concentrated in two major provinces (al Anbar and Saddam 
Hussein’s birthplace of Salah al Din) voted against it.  Although 2005 closed on a 
promising note with national assembly elections being held in December, there was an 
increase of 7,640 incidents recorded against coalition forces and civilian personnel during 
the year compared to 2004.62  
In 2006 the nascent Iraqi government struggled to establish its authority in the 
face of increasing, and increasingly complex, violence.  Sectarian conflict between Sunni 
insurgents and Shia extremists continued, and violent criminal gangs operated freely, 
while Iraqi and U.S. security forces actively attempted to suppress both.  On February 22, 
2006, al Qaeda operatives bombed one of the most revered Shia mosques in Iraq.  This 
sparked Shia extremists to form death squads that led to mass retaliatory executions of 
Sunni Arabs, including innocent civilians and religious leaders.63  Meanwhile, the U.S. 
military strategy was designed to reduce its footprint by placing greater emphasis on the 
Iraqi military and police.  This led to the build-up of massive Forward Operating Bases 
(FOB), in which a majority of the coalition forces was isolated from the community.  
Instead of immersing themselves in their areas of operation, combat units were 
sometimes required to travel long distances to and from a FOB, increasing their isolation 
and reducing their ability to understand what was going on around them.  With the rise in 
Sunni attacks on the Shia, a lack of confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces and lack of 
visibility of coalition forces, Shia neighborhoods were increasing reliant upon the militias 
for security.  However, after the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in February Shia  
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militias had shifted almost completely from providing local security to the creation of 
Shia death squads that targeted the Sunni population.  Shia communities were thus left 
with little or no security. 
The National Unity Government led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki took 
shape on May 20 in the context of increasing sectarian violence and a young Iraqi 
security force divided along ethnic lines.64  It was no secret that two of Maliki’s biggest 
supporters were Moqtada al Sadr, leader of the Mahdi militia, and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, 
leader of the Badr militia.  During the fall of 2006, sectarian violence reached its 
pinnacle.  According to the Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index Ranking, Iraq ranked 
fourth behind the Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo and the Ivory Coast, 
respectively.65  The death of Zarqawi on June 7th and the execution of Saddam Hussein 
on Dec 30, 2006 (after a highly publicized trial), did nothing to reduce sectarian 
tensions.66  “By the end 2006, Iraqis were dying at the rate of at least 3,000 per month. 
Americans were being killed at the rate of nearly 100 per month.”67 Approximately 1.8 
million people had fled the country while 1.6 million had been internally displaced from their 
homes by end of 2006.68 
Nevertheless, concerted efforts were being made by many Sunnis and Shias, as 
well as Coalition forces, to reduce sectarian violence.  At the same time, the U.S. 
government was reconsidering its Iraq strategy.  The White House commissioned a non-
partisan Iraq Study Group to chart the way forward.  Former President George H.W. 
Bush took a more direct role in the stabilization of Iraq, meeting directly with Abdul Aziz 
al-Hakim, one of the most powerful Shia leaders in Iraq who controls SCIRI and the Badr 
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militia.69  Current President Bush also signaled a change in strategy by replacing his 
increasingly controversial Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld with the moderate Robert 
Gates on December 18, 2006, and General George Casey with General David Petraeus on 
February 10, 2007.  Sheiks in Anbar province began negotiations with Coalition forces in 
August 2006, leading to an alliance that was made public at the beginning of 2007.70   
The new year also brought a change of U.S. military strategy focusing around a 
surge in troops designed to create enough security for Iraqi government institutions to 
start functioning.  General Petraeus went ahead with General Casey’s request for 30,000 
additional troops to be deployed to help quell sectarian violence.  Gone were the days of 
consolidating troops in large FOBs.  Instead they would be deployed throughout Iraq in 
numerous small combat outposts called Joint Security Stations (JSS), which would be 
integrated with Iraqi security forces and the population.  Although the new military 
strategy has been under fire since its inception in January 2007, the surge has led to 
improved security at the local level.  According to General Petraeus’ report to Congress 
in September, attacks in the four major provinces- Salah ad Din, Baghdad, Anbar, and 
Ninewah saw a sharp decline in 2007.71  His report also indicated a willingness to 
continue to strengthen alliances with Sunni militias in order to defeat al Qaeda in Iraq.  
However there was no indication of a similar willingness to work with Shia militias, 
which could perform a similar role in assisting with identifying and defeating Shia 
extremists and death squads.  The lack of engagement with Shia militias in 2007 has left 
violence again Coalition forces and violence between different militia groups seeking to 
establish control over territory unaddressed.  If the recent improvements in security in 
Sunni dominated areas are attributable to the Coalition’s engagement and empowering of 
militias to maintain local security, then such improvements are unlikely to be replicated 
in Shia areas under the current strategy, which would leave the U.S. hard pressed to 
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reduce its overall footprint in Iraq in the near future.  Is there such a direct link between 
strategies vis-à-vis militias and security and stability?  The rest of this chapter will argue 
that there is.   
1. U.S. Engagement of the Kurdish Peshmerga 
The Kurdish area of northern Iraq could serve as a model for future stability 
throughout the country.  The U.S. has consistently employed an engagement strategy 
with the Kurdish militia, known as the Peshmerga (“those who face death”).  The region 
epitomizes a U.S. military strategy that encourages the engagement and use of local 
militias to augment and reinforce security responsibilities.  Although the de facto 
autonomy of the Kurdish region in the 1990s allowed the Peshmerga to advance 
organizationally far beyond Shia militias (e.g., the Mahdi Militia founded in 2003), they 
clearly demonstrate that militias can be employed successfully to stabilize Iraq while 




Figure 3.   Area Controlled by the Peshmerga72 
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Like other militias established in Iraq, the Kurdish Peshmerga was gradually 
developed by two competing tribes that would later form Kurdish political parties, while 
still maintaining their militias during their rise to power.  Although it has existed in one 
form or another since the nineteenth century, the uprising against Saddam Hussein’s 
military forces in the 1990s molded it into a more capable and disciplined force, which 
facilitated the positive relationship it has maintained with U.S. forces since the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. The evacuation of Saddam Hussein’s government after 1991 forced (or 
allowed) the Kurdish region to create a pseudo-state, with something of a hybrid 
government based on tribal affiliations and a functioning western-style government, 
including an executive, legislative and judicial branch.  However this did not occur 
without significant political and human tragedy.  After Saddam Hussein was driven out of 
Kuwait by Coalition forces in 1991, the Kurdish Peshmerga was one of many popular 
militias to participate in an Iraqi uprising that took control of three-fourths of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, and 14 of 18 provinces across the country.  After Shia militias were defeated, 
Iraqi military forces were able to focus on northern Iraq and quickly overwhelmed the 
lightly armed Peshmerga.  Since the Peshmerga and other militias (that contributed in the 
uprising) had no international support, they were soon faced with severe food shortages 
that forced the withdrawal of their militias and negotiations between Kurdish leaders and 
Saddam Hussein.73A power struggle between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led 
by Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Massoud Barzani 
ultimately led to civil war in 1994 over the security of revenue and the leadership of 
Kurdistan.  A U.S. brokered peace agreement in 1998 led to the integration of the two 
political parties in order to strengthen their common position in the larger Iraqi context.  
Leaders also managed to integrate their militias, resulting in the 80,000 to 100,000 strong 
Peshmerga that has cooperated with the U.S. military since the invasion in 2003.74 
The U.S. engagement strategy vis-a-vis the Peshmerga grew out of the tactical 
relationships that were established prior to the invasion in 2003.  Since Turkey refused to 
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allow the U.S. 4th Infantry Division to invade Iraq from its territory, a small contingent of 
special operations officers deployed to Kurdish areas and co-opted approximately 65,000 
Kurdish Peshmerga forces to defeat “thirteen divisions of the Iraqi army – more than 
100,000 soldiers – along a 350-kilometer front.”75  This relationship also allowed U.S. 
forces to neutralize a well known insurgent group, Ansar al Islam, the notorious terrorist 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and al Qaeda in Kurdish dominated areas during the invasion 
phase of Operation Iraqi freedom.  By adopting the culture, dress, tactics, techniques and 
procedures of the Peshmerga, Special Forces units were able to accomplish a mission 
against a much larger enemy and over an immense geographic area, working with local 
militias instead of employing massive numbers of U.S. soldiers (that were no longer 
available anyway).  They also recognized that although the tactics of the Peshmerga 
differed from U.S. military tactics they were still very effective.  Thus, they did not try to 
force the militia to conduct missions the way the U.S. military would. For example, the 
militia did not use body armor, wore running shoes, carried few heavy weapons and 
assaulted the enemy using a frontal attack (as opposed to typical guerilla attacks 
employed by small rebel units).76  The Special Forces engagement of the Kurdish 
Peshmerga was imperative to the initial success of the invasion and disruption of Ansar 
al-Islam in 2003.  After forty-eight hours of intense fighting, Special Forces and the 
Kurdish Peshmerga had killed over 300 insurgents and secured 300 square kilometers of 
northern Iraq.  While the Special Forces operators did not suffer any casualties, the 
Kurdish Peshmerga suffered twenty-three wounded and three killed in action.77  The 
engagement strategy had the same effect when the outnumbered Special Forces units 
were faced with fighting the Iraqi Army.  At the end of the day, the invasion of Iraq 
would not have been able to succeed without the engagement of the Kurdish Peshmerga.  
By the time the invasion was over, one Special Forces battalion along with 26,000  
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Kurdish militiamen were able to “capture Iraq’s third-largest city, defeat six Iraqi 
divisions, capture 600 and killed 859 enemy soldiers, and seize 6,000 square kilometers 
of territory.”78 
As elsewhere in Iraq, Kurdish cities began to descend into chaos due to the 
security vacuum that was created by the defeat of the Iraqi Army.  However, the Special 
Forces recognized the impending disaster and the Kurdish Peshmerga was the only 
security apparatus available able to suppress angry crowds and looters until they were 
able to hand over operational control to the 101st Airborne Division led by Major General 
Petraeus. 79  However, there was a brief period during which the 101st was unwilling to 
engage the Peshmerga, which showed how quickly an area not controlled by the 
Peshmerga could descend into chaos.  Immediately after the 101st arrived into Northern 
Iraq, they began to limit Peshmerga authority by confiscating their weapons, which 
enabled insurgents and criminals to reorganize and recover from the recent success of the 
joint Peshmerga-SF operations.  This was followed by the re-eviction of Kurdish families 
from their ancestral homes, which had been taken from them during Saddam’s 
Arabization policy in the 1990’s, and to which they had recently returned.  Lastly, the 
U.S. endorsed the establishment of a Kurdish army battalion under the leadership of 
former Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi consisting of soldiers that did not participate in the 
successful joint Kurdish-SF battles against Iraqi Army units.  This caused many of the 
loyal Kurdish militia members to abandon their Peshmerga units in an effort to benefit 
financially from salaries to be paid to the new battalion, leaving some militias in a 
significantly weakened state and unable to protect northern cities like Mosul against a 
growing insurgency.  The army battalion, meanwhile, never amounted to a substantial 
force and was slowly dissolved into obscurity for two reasons.  First, many of the soldiers 
were later arrested by U.S. forces after “they were found looting abandoned homes of 
former members of Saddam Hussein’s regime,” while they were still in uniform and 
when they were supposed to be supporting U.S. troops with security immediately after 
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the fall the Baath party.80  Second, less than a year after Chalabi was brought in by the 
White House and Pentagon as a contender for the post-invasion presidency of Iraq, he 
was abandoned by the U.S. due to accusations that he was “passing classified information 
to Iran and money laundering in Iraq.”81The sudden change in U.S. strategy to non-
engagement of the Kurdish militias resulted in an increasingly hostile population, and a 
weakened militia unable to combat a growing insurgency, which left U.S. forces fighting 
alone.  Many U.S. soldiers who had been working with the Peshmerga were shocked.  
One captured the general sentiment: “The Kurds bled with us. They died in this war, for 
our cause. They are our comrades. They know this city.  They know Mosul. Good God, 
they know all northern Iraq…our Commanding general gave them the boot.”82  The 101st 
soon recognized the need to modify its strategy because the Kurds “felt slighted that – 
despite their demonstrated loyalty to the coalition forces they had received only a minor 
allocation of reconstruction funds.”83  MG Petraeus soon reversed course, ensuring that 
the 101st would continue the strategy of engagement fostered by the Special Forces by 
augmenting the Peshmerga with “two engineer battalions to expand airfields, and help the 
Kurds train and equip border guards, train civil defense forces, rebuild schools, and 
complete various water projects.”84 
Engagement with the Peshmerga continued to serve as a coherent U.S. military 
strategy after the fall of Saddam, producing one of the few examples of stability during a 
chaotic period.  Once installed, the interim Iraqi government also recognized the benefits 
of employing the Kurdish militias.  They were immediately called upon to serve as 
border guards and fill major security voids on the Iraq-Iran border in August 2003.  
Additionally the U.S. would benefit by immediately employing the Kurdish militias to 
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protect the fragile oil infrastructure, which U.S. planners hoped to use to pay for 
reconstruction of the country.  Furthermore, the U.S. used nearly 7,000 of the Peshmerga 
as interrogators, perimeter security guards, neighborhood patrolmen and soldiers to track 
down and destroy radical insurgent movements such as Ansar al Islam and al Qaeda, 
which were determined to destabilize Iraq through a campaign of violence and terror.  
The U.S. went as far as integrating members of the Peshmerga militia into U.S. Army 
training exercises that were conducted in the continental United States.  Fort Irwin, 
California serves as a major training base where units validate their tactics, techniques, 
and procedures against an opposing force (OPFOR) intended to replicate situations in 
Iraq.  Therefore the engagement of select members of Kurdish militia “adds to the 
realism” during training exercises.85 
Given the heavy reliance upon and support of the Kurdish militia groups before, 
during and after the invasion of Iraq, it was somewhat quixotic that the CPA (the de facto 
U.S. government in Iraq) attempted to implement CPA Order 91 in June 2004, which 
suddenly made militias illegal.  Instead of augmenting nascent government security 
forces by embracing the experienced Kurdish militias, the CPA decided to abolish all 
militias in the country.  Like the 101st initial, poorly informed, effort to sideline the 
Peshmerga, this polarizing strategy of usurping control over proven security elements 
such as the Kurdish Peshmerga had the potential to undo everything the U.S. Special 
Forces had accomplished since January 2003.  Fortunately for the U.S., Kurdish political 
leaders recognized the futility of disbanding their militia in favor of nonexistent state 
security force and chose to ignore the CPA Order.86   
Since the implementation of CPA Order 91 in 2004 the U.S. strategy of trying to 
disband the Kurdish Peshmerga was officially abandoned after the approval of the 
constitution in 2005 in favor of a return to the strategy of engagement and quiet 
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recognition.87  And the strategy has continued to serve the U.S. well.  “[N]ot a single 
American soldier has been killed in Kurdistan since the start of the war in Iraq, and there 
hasn’t been a major terrorist attack in Arbil since June 2005.”88  The single most 
important factor in the Kurdish region maintaining the highest levels of stability in Iraq 
with the lowest number of U.S. troops has been the strategy of engaging militias.  
According to a poll conducted in early 2007, less than four percent of Kurds interviewed 
stated that they encountered any violence in Kurdistan compared to 41% of the 
population interviewed around the rest of Iraq.  The integration of the Peshmerga into 
Iraqi security forces stationed in Kurdistan has also been well received by the civilian 
population.  For example, interviewees living in Iraqi Kurdistan were asked if they 
perceived unnecessary violence by U.S./Coalition forces, local militias, police, and the 
Army.  U.S./Coalition forces received the least favorable response, with nine percent of 
respondents saying that they use unnecessary violence – a very low number by Iraqi 
standards.  They were followed by local militia, with two percent, the Iraqi police with 
one percent, and the Iraqi Army with an unbelievable zero percent.89  According to a 
March 2007 Department of Defense report measuring stability in Iraq, the four provinces 
primarily controlled by the Kurdish Peshmerga, had the lowest levels of tension in the 
country.  On a zero to 10 scale, tensions within neighborhoods in the region scored a two.  
This has also resulted in over 89% of the Kurdish population being satisfied with the 
local area in which they live.  These Kurdish provinces were among the top four with the 
lowest levels of violence throughout Iraq when sampling the time period of November 
2006 to February 2007.90  Clearly, the engagement strategy that the U.S. has utilized with 
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the Kurdish Peshmerga since the invasion of Iraq has, at a minimum, contributed to 
higher levels of stability in the Kurdish provinces. 
2. From Defeat to Engagement: the U.S. Military and Sunni Militias 
As with the Kurdish Peshmerga, Sunni militias were established along tribal lines.  
Sunni militias grew out of the historical experience of the Bedouin tribes, for whom “it 
was the duty of all able-bodied men to join kinship militias” in order to ensure the 
“protection and survival” of the local tribe.91  However, after the invasion the Sunni 
population was much more skeptical about the future of Iraq than the Kurds, since the 
Sunnis had been the primary beneficiaries of Baath party largesse.  The Sunni minority 
quickly became fearful that they would be marginalized by the Shia and Kurdish 
majority, which made them more susceptible to insurgent mobilization.  Unlike Kurdish 
militias who were accepting of both the new Iraqi government and the Coalition, Sunni 
militias were skeptical of both the U.S.-led Coalition and the Shia-dominated Iraqi 
government.  Because the U.S. knew that the Sunnis were distrustful and supported 
Saddam they were less inclined to try to work with them, or didn’t think there was any 
possibility of shared interests.  That would also have reinforced the Sunni perceptions of 
the U.S. as an enemy. However, the fact that Sunnis and their militias did not whole-
heartedly accept the establishment of a government or the American occupation does not 
mean they were unwilling to negotiate.  After the Iraqi Army was removed from Kuwait 
in 1991, Saddam lost control of 14 of 18 provinces.  He reestablished control of the 
provinces by “subcontracting security to tribal chiefs who were given arms and authority 
to establish local militias.” Nevertheless, the U.S. was unwilling to engage Sunni militias 
and focused their efforts instead on the creation of state controlled security forces.  In 
response militia members -- now considered “Sunni Rejectionists – joined the insurgency 
[used] these irregular methods of organizing and fighting” and also “adapted their 
traditional form of [guerilla warfare and tactics] to modern weapons and means.”92 
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The Sunni insurgency includes former regime elements of the Baath party, tribal 
groups, foreign fighters, and Islamic extremists such as al Qaeda.93  Sunni tribes did not 
immediately join the insurgency, but instead waited to see what the future would hold.  
Ultimately what the future held for most Sunnis in Iraq was a declining standard of 
living, and increasing insecurity as the Coalition strategy emphasized on kinetic military 
operations and did not seek to engage the tribal sheiks.94   
Prior to the invasion, U.S. military units were specifically trained to fight in a 
high intensity, conventional operation.  The overall strategy was to defeat the Iraqi army 
and redeploy.  This reflected President George W. Bush’s commitment not to engage the 
U.S military in nation-building activities.  During his 2000 presidential campaign he 
stated: “I would be very careful about using our troops as nation builders.  I believe the 
role of the military is to fight and win war…I believe we’re overextended in too many 
places.” 95 He continued to emphasize this strategy after the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001.  However Iraq’s post-conflict environment required the immediate 
employment of basic counterinsurgency and policing techniques, such as the non-violent 
engagement of local militias.  Military units deployed to Iraq lacked this training.  The 
U.S. military was not designed for post-conflict operations that involve soldiers engaging 
local leaders regarding subjects of governance, security, employment, basic service 
provision, etc.  Given this and the absence of appropriate actors to undertake such 
engagement, military strategy remained kinetic, which ultimately alienated the population 
and encouraged them to ally with insurgent forces such as al Qaeda.  Abdul Razak al 
Muaimi, a Sunni day laborer in his thirties, told a reporter that he chose to resist the 
occupation because of the way he was treated by Coalition forces.  “U.S. soldiers 
searched my house.  They kicked my Koran.  They speak to me so poorly in front of my  
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children.  It’s not that I encourage my son to hate Americans.  It’s not that I make him 
want to join the resistance.  Americans do that for me.”96  Other Sunni insurgents report 
similar treatment. 
There have been some that say ‘hello’ or ‘peace be unto you’ in Arabic to 
me…but others treat us like dogs.  I saw one put his boot on the head of an 
old man lying on the ground [during a raid].  Even Saddam would not 
have done such a thing.  It was then I realized that they had come as 
occupiers and not as liberators.  So we began to meet and plan.  We met 
with others and have tried to buy weapons.  None of us are afraid to die, 
but it is hard.  We are just men, workers, not soldiers…97 
Unfortunately, this type of conventional ‘one size fits all’ tactical strategy that permeated 
most military engagements was employed instead of engaging local militias to assist 
national police forces with local security responsibilities. 
The U.S. endorsement of a strong central government also encouraged Sunni 
militias to resist the Coalition.  Sunni tribes have always resisted a strong central 
government because it is antithetical to tribal culture.  It was even difficult for Saddam 
Hussein to deal with Sunni militias, despite the fact that his power base was in the Sunni 
areas.  For example, members of the Dulaim tribe (of 750,000) based out of the city of 
Ramadi in the heart of the Anbar province, attempted to rebel against Saddam in 1992 
and 1995, but were quickly suppressed by Saddam’s praetorian security forces.  Yet, 
because many members of the Dulaim tribe were integrated in the Baath party, Saddam 
was obligated to acknowledge their existence and compromise with them to forestall a 
major tribal rebellion.98  U.S. refusal to recognize Iraqi tribal structures increased support 
for the insurgency.  Tribal sheiks authority over the tribes rests upon their ability to 
provide financially for members of the tribe.  Saddam recognized this, and used the 
sheiks as intermediaries between his government and the masses.  When the U.S. failed  
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to engaged the sheiks, the sheiks authority was undermined.  As a result, military age 
males “joined criminal gangs or the insurgency” because the sheiks were no longer able 
to exercise authority over their actions. 99  
Much of the same continued from 2003 to 2006.  Both stability and security 
continued to decline in Anbar.  Combat operations dominated the agenda for Anbar in 
2004.  The city of Fallujah was witness to one of the largest military offensives since the 
invasion of Iraq.  By April 2004, Fallujah had become a terrorist haven for both foreign 
fighters and terrorists such as Zarqawi.  U.S. officials attempted to allow the newly 
formed Iraqi forces to take over security but would later succumb to insurgent violence.  
Thus a U.S. military offensive to regain the city of 300,000 commenced in the fall of 
2004 leaving most of the city abandoned and destroyed.   Since the majority of Sunnis 
felt that Iraq’s budding political establishment was illegitimate, the elections that 
occurred in 2005 further exacerbated levels of instability in Sunni dominated areas such 
as Anbar.  Moderate Sunni political groups such as the Iraqi Islamic party, the largest 
Sunni party, withdrew arguing that high levels of violence would prevent a “free and fair 
vote,”  while conservative Sunni groups continued to boycotted elections on the grounds 
that they were endorsed by the United States.100  Further isolation of the Sunni 
population led to increased support for the insurgency which led to greater sectarian 
conflict.  Many Sunni’s later felt that the Iraqi government was not truly reflective of the 
Anbar province due to low voter turnout.  By 2006, Anbar was embroiled in conflict with 
little to no hope for increased stability.  The U.S. continued to pursue a strategy that 
placed greater emphasis on the development of Iraqi security forces represented by the 
government while virtually ignoring the employment of local tribes and their militias for 
local security.  Levels of security and stability were so low that Brigadier General Carter 
Ham, the deputy director for regional operations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that 
Ramadi (the capital for Anbar), a city of approximately 450,000 is “probably the most 
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contentious city right now inside Iraq.”101  After thirty-three U.S. military personnel 
died in Anbar province in August 2006, the Marine Corps chief intelligence analyst, 
Colonel (COL) Pete Devlin, recognized as one of their best intelligence officers, filed an 
“unusual secret report concluding that the prospects for securing [the] Anbar province are 
dim and that there is almost nothing the U.S. military can do to improve the political and 
social situation.”102  The report outlined how the Sunni dominated province was devoid 
of any functional local security apparatus or government, which allowed insurgent groups 
such as al Qaeda to fill the vacuum.  This was not an isolated assessment either.  An 
anonymous Army officer reported that “we haven’t been defeated militarily but we have 
been defeated politically – and that’s where wars are won and lost.”103  Others, including 
flag officers who found the report too pessimistic concur that Anbar might be lost, and 
suggested that the prospects for the rest of the country were less dire.  However, given 
that Anbar encompasses over 30 percent of Iraqi land mass and borders Syria and Jordan, 
the loss of the province by the U.S. military would likely have had a significant influence 
on the political and security environment in the rest of Iraq.   
The military was left with few options.  The report acknowledged that a shortage 
of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers left it unable to maintain security beyond the perimeter of its 
Forward Operating Bases.  One option was a complete transfer of security to the 
fledgling Iraqi security forces.  However, that would set the conditions for a full blown 
civil war.  Another option was to reinforce Anbar province with an additional military 
unit slated for another area of Iraq, which would leave other commanders scrambling to 
fill the void in other parts of the country.104    
By September 2006, one man recognized the need change strategy, and identified 
a third option.  U.S. Army Colonel (COL) Sean MacFarland, commander of First 
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Brigade, First Armored Division responsible for the Sunni dominated city of Ramadi 
“was willing to try just about anything to win over the population and reduce violence in 
Ramadi.”105  In this case, anything meant engagement with Sunni militias.  The strategy 
included stationing his units in vulnerable combat outposts instead of consolidating 
forces in heavily fortified Forward Operating Bases (FOBs).  He felt as if he “was going 
the wrong way down a one way street” since his approach did not reflect the operational 
military strategy Sunni and Shia dominated provinces of Iraq.106  In contrast to the 
prevailing strategy that focused on kinetic military operations, COL MacFarland opted to 
negotiate with Sunni sheiks.  Based on MacFarland’s initial success, the engagement 
strategy was adopted in Anbar province as a whole, dramatically improving levels of 
security and stability in less than twelve months.107 
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Figure 4.   Depiction of Tribal Affiliation in Iraq108 
 
The decision of militia leaders to begin working with U.S. forces was based on 
two factors.  The first was COL MacFarland’s efforts to engage them to provide their 
own security, in recognition of the failure of the strategy of relying upon newly trained 
and poorly armed Iraqi security forces, which had assumed the role of security-provider 
prematurely and in an area they are unfamiliar with.  The second factor was a new 
willingness of Sunni tribes to ally with Coalition forces for the purpose of driving out al-
Qaeda forces after they killed scores of local Sunnis who refused to accept their hard-line 
puritanical ideology.  The breaking point in this regard came when al Qaeda “killed a 
prominent sheik…and refused to let family members bury the body for four days, 
enraging Sunni tribesmen.”109 
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COL MacFarland’s initial success grew from engagement with the Anbar 
Salvation Council also known as the (Anbar Awakening), founded by Sheik Abdul Sittar 
al-Rishawi of the Albu Risha tribe in September 2006.  Prior to 2006, Sittar was known 
for little more than as a “ringleader [for] successful highway bandits” who offered short-
lived support to al-Qaeda elements in efforts to defeat U.S. forces patrolling in Ramadi 
until he began to recognize the honest engagement COL MacFarland made with him in 
attempt to defeat al Qaeda terrorists wreaking havoc in the city of Ramadi.  However, 
COL MacFarland recognized the importance of Sheik Sittar as soon as he met him in 
August 2006.  When COL MacFarland met with Maamoun Sami Rashid al-Awani, the 
governor of Anbar province, on previous occasions it was always only the two of them.  
However, meetings at Sheik Sittar’s compound would be filled to capacity with 
prominent local sheiks and local police officials who never showed up to meetings called 
by the governor of Anbar.  The result of the initial engagement between MacFarland and 
Sittar was an agreement that “the U.S. would build and secure a series of police stations 
in Ramadi, where insurgents had run off the cops…In return, Sittar would send recruits, 
hundreds of them, to join local security forces, which MacFarland wants to see take the 
lead in the battle to regain control of the city.”110  There were immediate improvements 
to the local police force.  In July 2006, police forces in Ramadi barely numbered 150.  By 
November, nearly 500 had volunteered.  This also led to the establishment of Emergency 
Response Units (ERU), which were overtly loyal to local sheiks and numbered over 
2,500 personnel.  They were approved and paid by the Ministry of Interior and trained in 
either forty-five day police training courses in Jordan or seven courses on a military base 
in Ramadi.  Since the Sunni community had always resented the Shia-dominated security 
forces that were deployed to the Anbar province by the Shia-dominated government, the 
use of local militias as security providers was a welcome change.  According to U.S. 
Army platoon leader, First Lieutenant Nathan Strickland, “20 percent of the credit for the 
change in Ramadi could be taken by U.S. forces….the vast majority of the turnaround is 
due to the sheiks.”111 
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Insurgent groups recognized the detrimental impact the U.S. strategy of 
engagement with militias was having on their objectives, and attempted to disrupt the 
relationship established between the Anbar Awakening and the U.S. military.  They 
failed utterly.  On September 13, 2007, Sheik Sittar was killed by al Qaeda affiliates in a 
roadside bomb attack just ten days after President George W. Bush met with him in a 
“surprise visit to Anbar to extol the Sunni cooperation that has made the province once 
Iraq’s most dangerous, relatively safe.”112  Fortunately for the U.S. military and the 
Anbar Awakening, Sheik Ahmed Abu Risha, Sittar’s brother, stepped in to fulfill his 
brother’s role.  Sheik Risha reaffirmed the strength of the alliance with the U.S. in the 
strongest terms: “[T]he martyrdom of Sittar will not affect this council because every 
member of this council has the same beliefs and the same motivations and this sad 
incident will not stop them from moving forward.”113 
The results of COL MacFarland’s strategy of engagement with militias were 
staggering.  In September 2006, twenty-five of thirty-one tribes located in Anbar 
province had joined the Anbar Awakening.114  By October 2007, violent deaths in the 
Anbar province were down by 82 percent.115  Additionally attacks against the U.S. 
military in August 2007 were just over 200 compared to October 2006 when they peaked 
at 1,400 a month.  Colonel Martin Stanton, Chief of Reconciliation and Engagement for 
Multinational Corps, Iraq, reports that four months after COL MacFarland began his 
engagement with the Anbar Awakening, the “10th Mountain Division’s 2nd Brigade saw 
its casualty rate plunge from 12 deaths a month to just one.”116  The engagement strategy 
also contributed to improved success with finding and clearing weapon caches.  In 
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Multinational Division North, 40 of 72 weapons caches were cleared by locally formed 
militia groups consisting of Concerned Local Citizens.117  Overall, a total of 2,111 caches 
were found in just eight months of 2007 versus 1,222 in all of 2006.118 
The Anbar model of engagement has been gradually accepted in other Sunni 
dominated areas of Iraq.  In the rural town of Qarghulia, located in east Baghdad, local 
militias comprised of Sunnis and Shias now occupy 42 of 49 Coalition-approved traffic 
points.  Prior to their employment, the area was patrolled by the national police, which 
are “mistrusted by the populace.”  Captain Troy Thomas, the commander responsible for 
this engagement, insists: “I couldn’t do it without them,” acknowledging that providing 
security is beyond the capabilities of his forces, and also that the militias “perform with a 
sensitivity that no U.S. soldier could match.”  He also suggests that they serve U.S. 
interests better that U.S. forces could: they are from the area and thus “they know who 
should be there and who shouldn’t.”119Approximately 39,000 militia members of the 
70,000 countrywide are paid between $100 and $125 dollars a month.  Although, this is 
approximately “half the starting wage for a government worker, [it constitutes] real cash 
for a young man” who was formerly unemployed and at greater risk to insurgent 
influence.120 This new strategy has also had a residual effect on the unification of Sunni 
and Shia Sheiks against insurgents like al Qaeda.  On November 8, 2007, U.S. military 
commanders were notified about a meeting involving over thirty Sunni and Shia tribes, 
which publicly declared their unification to fight against al-Qaeda and “work toward a 
lasting peace for their region.”121   
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The success of this particular engagement strategy has not been without its 
military skeptics.  Many senior military officers felt the risks of arming groups that 
formerly fought against U.S. troops outweighed the benefits, and refused to reward any 
Sunni groups “who have been responsible, even tangentially, for any of the more than 
29,000 American casualties in the war.” Major General Rick Lynch, commander of the 
Third Infantry Division who is responsible for the major land mass south of Baghdad said 
that “no U.S. support would be given to any Sunni group that has attacked 
Americans.”122  Other officers have questioned the change in motives of many tribal 
sheiks.  Colonel Martin Stanton, Chief of Multinational Corps Reconciliation Unit 
initially asked if “this is just another way that someone can position himself to siphon his 
share in the community and be the godfather?”123  Yet, he soon realized that the will of 
people to stop the violence was greater than personal gain. Some others also changed 
their minds in recognition of the positive effects of engagement with local militias.124  
3. The Semantics of Security 
Clashes between the U.S. military and the Mahdi Militia in 2004 and rise of 
sectarian extremism in 2006 gave a negative connotation of the term ‘militia.’ The 
inroads made by U.S. forces in engaging and working with local militias groups since late 
2006 has thus been accompanied by a semantic evolution.  The estimated 70,000 local 
citizens who have joined formed local security groups that work alongside U.S. and Iraqi 
state security forces have not been referred to as militias.   Instead, they are called 
Concerned Local Citizens, Critical Infrastructure Guard Force, Iraqi Citizen-Volunteers, 
and the Anbar Awakening.125  The only difference between these groups and the militias 
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prior to 2007 is that they are now recognized as legitimate by U.S. military forces.  
Approximately half of the 70,000 who have signed up are paid by with U.S. funds.  The 
rest are serving as volunteers.126  Developing and employing ‘Concerned Local Citizens’ 
has been an option since 2003, when many of the same neighborhoods were protected by 
local militias staffed by these same people.  Instead, CPA Order 91 implemented a U.S. 
strategy of demobilizing the militias in favor of a national police force that is untrained, 
unfamiliar with the local terrains in which it was deployed, and unprepared to perform 
local security responsibilities.  This led to dangerous power vacuum that could have been 
avoided if U.S. decision-makers had considered a strategy to engage, co-opt, and support 
local militias to perform local security functions and allow the Iraqi political and security 
apparatus to focus on regional and national security.  The next section shows how the 
ongoing strategy of demobilization or defeat in the Shia-dominated areas of Iraq since 
2004 has prevented U.S. forces from engaging and influencing moderate militias, as they 
did in Anbar, which in turn drove Shia militias to seek financial and material support 
from external actors on the one hand, and facilitated the explosion of criminal violence in 
these areas on the other.  Comparison with the Anbar experience suggests that the U.S. 
could gain the support of popular Shia militias, which could serve as local security 
providers in these areas, reducing both violence and the need for larger numbers of U.S. 
forces.    
4. U.S. Strategy and Shia Militias 
As in the Kurdish and Sunni cases above, Shia militias also gained considerable 
power after the fall of the Baath party in 2003, due to the security vacuum, which 
Coalition forces were unable to fill.  Religious elites affiliated with militias assumed 
positions of authority by default.  They were recognized by a majority of the Shia 
population as bearing the responsibility of providing security, governance and stability 
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after the collapse of the state.127  Immediately following the fall of Saddam Hussein, 
local neighborhoods were stricken with uncontrolled looting and vandalism for over two 
months.128  Cultural sites such as the National Library and Iraqi National Museum saw 
ancient artifacts and historical archives destroyed and burned.  Public institutions such as 
Baghdad and Mosul University were stripped of all administrative and logistical supplies.  
Stability dissolved along with the Iraqi security forces, replaced by U.S. military force 
that was extremely effective in conducting conventional military operations but too small 
and not appropriately trained to perform security and stability operations in a country of 
27 million people.  Lawlessness was pervasive and local neighborhoods were forced to 
protect themselves.  The establishment of security and stability services through the 
employment of local Shia militias at the local level was a natural process.  Local citizens 
knew they could trust these groups to actually protect them, while Coalition forces were 
not allowed by their civilian leadership to intervene as looting and vandalism extirpated 
Iraq’s infrastructure.129   
Thus, Shia militia leaders and subordinates had little choice but to establish their own 
form of militia governance in place of the deposed regime and inability of U.S. forces to 
provide local security.  Sadr City is an excellent example of local religious authorities 
establishing their own forms of governance in order to provide some semblance of order to 
their sprawling communities.  However, they were careful not to promise what they could not 
deliver.  Religious leaders such as Sheikh Abdel-Rahman Shuweili were inundated with 
requests that included such issues as employment, locating stolen goods, medical facilities, 
religious taxes, etc.130 The Shia militia leaders established a number of committees using the 
only formal law left after the fall of the Baathist regime: Islamic law.  In conjunction with 
Shuweili’s outreach committee, Shia militias organized a number of other subcommittees 
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that included, “health services, media, religious edicts, Islamic law courts, and, somewhat 
ambitiously, electricity and telecommunications.”131  However, this included the 
establishment of the notorious vice and virtue committee, which conflicted with the 
western democratic intentions of the CPA.  This committee came to be feared by local 
citizens due to its strict interpretation of Islamic law.  For example, women were strongly 
encouraged to be veiled, stores that sold alcohol were shut down, and movies considered 
indecent were banned.132  Yet, it was impossible to prevent Shia militias from 
establishing such groups because they were the legitimate authority available.  
The Mahdi Militia was established by Moqtada al-Sadr, a young Shia cleric.133  
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Moqtada al-Sadr resurrected the Sadr 
movement using Shia mosques throughout Iraq.  In April 2003 Al-Sadr’s followers, 
known as al-Sariyyun or Sadrists, created local militias of young Shia men who 
forcefully took over local hospitals and policing duties from the waning control of the 
Baath Party.134  Moqtada al-Sadr’s movement in 2003 can be described by its nationalist 
and religious undertones.  He made his anti-American sentiments clear when he “thanked 
God rather than the U.S. for religious freedom and for liberating us from dictatorship” in 
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April 2003.135  This appealed to the younger generation of Shias because they were 
attracted to the idea that Sadr was there to challenge the moderate stance of other Shiites, 
and his reputation was based on challenging the U.S. occupation and CPA.  Sadr gave the 
young Shia generation something to believe in and fight for.  During a Mahdi Militia 
insurrection in 2004, a foot soldier stated, “I’m defending our country, our holy 
places….What is making America so crazy is that we are fighting for our religion.”136  
The base of al-Sadr’s support consists of impoverished Shias who were violently 
suppressed during Saddam’s reign.137  However, the U.S. conducted a number of tactical 
military operations that spelled defeat for the Mahdi Militia and caused Sadr to shift from 
an armed struggle to politics and future national elections.  However, decades of decrepit 
conditions imposed upon the Shia population made it impossible for the United States 
military to establish better living conditions in a short period of time.  This allowed Sadr 
to build more legitimacy in the eyes of the impoverished Shia population through the 
failures of the CPA.  His base of support allows Moqtada al-Sadr to distance himself 
from occupation forces.  Many impoverished Shia expected United States military troops 
to immediately free them from oppression and torture experienced under the Sunni Baath 
party.138  Sadr’s militia created security patrols for the Shia population, returned stolen 
products and distributed food aid to the local populace.   Sadr’s anti-American sentiment 
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sought to gain greater power by establishing himself as an alternative to the moderate 
Shia voice that was accepting of the U.S. coalition presence and the creation of a U.S. 
backed government.  Al-Sadr’s presence and political strength will continue to grow.  He 
has a loyal following among the Shia population. The Mahdi army is more organized and 
well entrenched in the political arena, controlling of 32 of the 275 seats in the 
parliament.139  
 
Figure 5.   Poster of Moqtada al Sadr in Sadr City140 
 
The Badr Corps is recognized as the military arm for the Supreme Council for the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).  Founded in 1982 by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-
Hakim as a separatist faction that evolved from the Dawa party, SCIRI settled in Iran as 
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an opposition group to Saddam Hussein’s regime.141  It is described by Beehner and the 
Iraq Study Group as organized on sectarian lines and closely tied to the main political 
parties.142  After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Badr Corps pledged to disarm its regional 
militias.  However, due to sustained violence, and the unwillingness by the Kurdish 
Peshmerga to disarm, they have kept their arms but have pressed to license their weapons 
with the Iraqi government.143  SCIRI’s current leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is considered 
one of the most influential figures in Iraq. He does not hold a position in the government, 
but supports the current government and the coalition.144  Paradoxically, the Badr Corps 
supports the transition of Iraq even though their funding and training is occasionally 
provided by Iran, the coalition’s regional nemesis.145  Ironically, this Tehran-based group 
has maintained very good relations with the United States, as seen in a recent meeting 
between U.S. President George Bush and SCIRI’s al-Hakim in late 2006.146  The Badr 
Corps supports the SCIRI’s quest for a separate, Shia-controlled region in the southern 
                                                 
141  Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Influence in Iraq (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
2006), 2-3.  The Badr Corps history dates back to the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Early members of the Badr 
Corps were Iraqi Shia defectors and captured soldiers supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 
The Badr Corps is the second largest militia in Iraq.  Estimates of membership in the Corps (also known as 
the Badr brigade, the Badr Reconstruction Corps, and the Badr organization) range from 10,000 to 20,000. 
The Badr Corps has a large presence in the British occupied areas of southern Iraq.  
142  Beehner, Iraq: Militia Groups, 2.   
143  Katzman, Iran’s Influence in Iraq, 2. 
144  “Bush Meets Iraqi Shia Leader,” in Al Jazeera [database online]. Saudi Arabia December 4, 2006 
[cited 2007].  Available from http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/639A15E7-470E-4A37-9F72-
3DB19724A296.htm (accessed May 1, 2007). 
145  Cole, The United States and Shi ‘ite Religious Factions in Post-Ba ‘thist Iraq, 544.  Current U.S. 
diplomatic policy refuses to acknowledge Iran for reasons that would require analysis beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  It must be noted, however that a portion of the four million dollars the U.S. distributed to 
Ahmed Chalabi was intended to support the Iraqi National Congress, which was composed of SCIRI (based 
then in Tehran) and two moderate Shia political groups.  The Badr Corps has experienced its share of 
violence and mistrust resulting in retaliation and the refusal to lay down their arms.  On August 29, 2004, 
their influential moderate leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, was among the SCIRI members 
killed by a truck bomb in An Najaf.  The death of al-Hakim and approximately one hundred others created 
a massive backlash against coalition forces for failing to maintain stability. This led to a collusion of 
convenience between the Badr Corps and the Mahdi Militia, both calling for immediate coalition 
withdrawal. 
146  Aljazeera.net, Bush Meets Iraqi Shia Leader, 2; “President Bush Meets with His Eminence Abdul-
Aziz al Hakim, Leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,” in Office of the Press 
Secretary [database online]. Washington, D.C. December 4, 2006 [cited 2007].  Available from 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061204-7.html. (accessed May 1, 2007). 
 48
part of the country.147  The ideological goals of SCIRI are based on the Iranian doctrine 
of velayat-e faqih, which calls for clerical intervention in political affairs.148  They could 
be described as a militia with a primarily religious goal.  Yet when this group oscillates 
their support between democracy and Islamic law, it soon becomes clear that religion has 
been used as a pragmatic tool to mobilize populous support for their politically driven 
goals.149  SCIRI is a major supporter of the current Iraqi government, paradoxically 
making it difficult for the coalition to adopt a policy to eliminate militias in Iraq.   
The Shia general population approves of the Badr Corps’ overall political goal of 
a Shia autonomous region in control of a large portion of Iraqi oil reserves.  Economic 
incentives appear in the form of the provision of basic services and employment.  For 
example, the Badr Corps maintains a strong presence in the Iraqi police, public order 
brigades, and special commando units. Badr Corps’ strong presence in Iraq’s interior 
ministry has proven useful for the party’s social mobilization.150  The Badr Corps 
presents a difficult challenge to other state leaders in Iraq.  They have been praised by 
current and former Iraqi political leaders, such as Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, for their 
organization and their ability to maintain security in certain regions.  Iraq’s former 
Interior Minister was a senior Badr Corps official.  Furthermore, the Iraqi government 
supported establishment of the Wolf Brigades under the control of former Badr Corps 
officers and they have proven their mettle. They have fought alongside coalition and Iraqi 
units, but are notorious for the brutal torture, violence, and humiliation of Sunni 
insurgents.  Their harsh methods of maintaining security promulgates sectarian violence 
through targeted revenge attacks against the Sunni population, and Iraqi political leaders 
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like the former Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr who has turned a blind eye to their 
questionable techniques.151  The Badr Corps provides basic services to Shia 
communities, including   structured security and support for local governance, but they 
are implicated in mass killings of Sunni Muslims, frequently clash with British 
occupation forces, refuse to disarm, and occasionally resist some government policies.    
The relationship among the Shia militias is ambiguous. Although Moqtada al-
Sadr promotes an Iraqi nationalist view of Shia unity, he is supported by Iran.  There are 
numerous reports of Badr Corps clashes with other Shia militias and coalition forces, 
including struggles over the southern city of Amarah in July 2006 and for control of the 
shrine of Imam ‘Ali in Najaf.152  Competition for political power and regional authority 
will continue to spark clashes between the Mahdi Militia and the Badr Corps, but at the 
end of the day they have one thing in common: their commitment to Shia political rule 
without foreign intervention.  This commonality is a key discriminator between Iraqi 
militias, insurgencies and criminal organizations.  A basic premise of Shia militias is to 
maintain power at the local level but still cooperate with the government in order to unify 
with the government in an effort to remove a coalition presence from Iraq.  For example, 
Moqtada al-Sadr demonstrated this by withdrawing his political movement from Iraq’s 
struggling government on April 16, 2007.  This gives Al-Sadr an opportunity to gain 
support by showing the Shia population that the Mahdi Militia can provide social 
services, religious support, and security. 
The current U.S. strategy towards Shia militias can be traced back to documents 
published by the CPA after the fall of the Baath party.  Many of the Shia clerical leaders were 
overjoyed with the removal of the former dictator; however emotions of happiness were 
replaced with skepticism when the CPA began imposing rules and laws similar to those of 
the former Baath party government.  Sheikh Abdel-Rahman Shuweili, an activist in the Sadr 
movement who was released from jail (Abu Ghraib) in October 2002 after being swept up in 
a mass arrest campaign following the assassination of Moqtada al-Sadr’s father in 1999, was 
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the leader of the Sadr outreach committee in 2003.  He expressed distress about the edicts 
of the newly established occupation by Coalition forces, suggesting that it had essentially 
established itself as another dictator, demanding that the new local councils it established 
accept and honor “all decrees, orders, and instructions” published by the CPA.153  Shia 
religious elites, such as Shuweili, who had faced oppression from the ruling Baath party, 
were particularly angry about the perceived lack of consideration given to the religious 
community, especially since the justification for the invasion changed from finding 
weapons of mass destruction to establishing democracy through regime change.  They 
felt that if the intent of the U.S. was to transfer power to the Iraqi majority then all 
leaders, both political and religious should have been involved.  Shuweili stated: “If you 
just obey their orders, then you are doing no more than following their wishes…Their 
orders should take into account Islam…Every country has its own traditions – Syria, Iran, 
America, Africa.  They should respect Islam and our traditions.”154  Removing a dictator 
and replacing it with another form of governance accepted only by a foreign occupier 
could lead to unwelcome consequences.  By excluding certain elements of the population, 
the CPA created animosity among local religious and non-participating political leaders, 
and their supports in the neighborhoods.  As a result, religious leaders like Shuweili 
began to develop their own plans for the future of Iraq.  In order to protect themselves 
from Sunni insurgents and former regime elements from the Baath party, Shia militias 
began to arm themselves in self-defense.  The Badr Corps and the Mahdi Militia were the 
two largest Shia militias to respond to threats of violence.  The Badr Corps is active 
largely in the British controlled areas of Southern Iraq, while the Mahdi Militia has a 
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5. Mahdi Militia  
During the initial post-conflict operations in 2003, the Mahdi militia (also known 
as Mahdi Army) was not seen as a threat, but rather as a trouble-making group that got in 
the way of American interests.  Civilian personnel with oversight of reconstruction 
projects in militia-dominated areas such as Sadr City made no attempt to understand their 
design or intention.156  The Mahdi militia served in a relatively non-threatening fashion 
in the eyes of most Shia neighborhood residents, appealing in particular to the majority 
opposed to the Coalition presence.  As the U.S. occupation dragged on with little 
improvement in security, unfulfilled promises for reconstruction, and continued 
aggressive military tactics, residents became angry.157  Initially, the mantra of the Mahdi 
Militia was support and protection.  Its intention was to pursue a non-violent, religious 
path to serve and support local neighborhoods.  Its members were prohibited from 
carrying weapons, and the organization was mandated to “devote itself to social work and 
the poor.”158  This was no small feat: areas such as Sadr City were overpopulated, 
underemployed and basic services were severely lacking.  One of Sadr’s lieutenants 
announced: “We are founding the army without weapons.  There is no intention to use 
any force.”159  The lack of communication by both the Mahdi militia and the CPA only 
nurtured divisiveness between the two groups.  The CPA lacked a strategy for dealing 
with the growing threat of militias that were increasingly anti-American.  Very few U.S. 
civilian or military personnel understood the Mahdi Militia’s role in society or the depth 
of popular support for it.  U.S. military forces were identified as the most appropriate tool 
to deal with this irregular threat.  However, these forces were designed and trained for 
conventional combat operations, and thus employed kinetic operations.   
                                                 
156  Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, Or Division?, 133-134 
157  Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War, 258-259. 
158  Shadid, 258. 
159  Ibid. 
 52
 
Figure 6.   (From Left) Iraqi Army Company Commander, NAC Chairman, and 
Sadr City Cleric (affiliated with the Mahdi Militia) Discussing Governance 
During Neighborhood Advisory Council Meeting160 
 
6. Non-engagement and Stability 
Since major combat operations have subsided between U.S. and militia forces in 
2004, there has not been a concerted effort to engage or co-opt Shia militias to improve 
local security and stability.  Sadr resisted Coalition forces in three phases: “the peaceful 
resistance, like speeches and demonstrations; the military resistance, which was 
represented by two uprisings all over Iraq, and the political resistance, which we attained 
by reaching political posts and demanding a timetable for the departure of U.S troops.”161 
There has been an inherent conflict between the United States and Moqtada al 
Sadr since August 2003, when the Mahdi Militias was officially formed.  The 
establishment of a strong central government led by Iraqi officials that were appointed by 
the CPA served as the initial method for transferring control from U.S. to Iraqi hands.  
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However, Moqtada al Sadr believed (and still does) that re-building the country should be 
done Iraqis without the presence of a foreign occupation.  From 2003 to April 2004 Sadr 
supporters protested the occupation through speeches and peaceful demonstrations. This 
only solidified the CPA’s stance that Sadr was a trouble-making firebrand cleric and 
rabble-rouser intent upon destabilizing the country.162  However, to many of his 
followers, largely the young, unemployed, and dispossessed, he is viewed as a leader who 
has stood up for the underdog. 
Lack of an engagement strategy coupled with saber-rattling by both sides led to a 
military struggle that began in April 2004 and culminated with a negotiated cease fire in 
October 2004, in which Sadr publicly announced the Mahdi Militia would not attack 
American forces.163  However, Sadr officials emphasized that attacks on Coalition 
soldiers could continue with justification if the actions of American soldiers were deemed 
to be disrespectful, asserting that “avenging dignity is part of the Arab identity.”164 
Therefore, attacks such as sniper fire, and roadside bombings such as Explosively 
Formed Penetrators (EFP- a signature bomb employed by the Mahdi Militia) became 
more prevalent.165  
If the militia uprisings of 2004 were the nadir of the Mahdi Militia openness to 
U.S. engagement, then political maneuvering by the Sadr bloc in 2005 was the apogee of 
potential engagement.  However, tactical military units made little effort to integrate local 
Sadr bureaus (political offices that represented the Mahdi Militia) into the reconciliation 
process and instead continued to promote the creation of local neighborhood advisory 
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councils (NACs) and District Advisory Councils (DACs) that were inadequately 
resourced by the government and unsupported by the local population, which saw them 
as illegitimate.  Meanwhile Sadr bureaus served as the legitimate power broker and 
service provider in these neighborhoods.166  The chance for engagement with local units 
of the Mahdi Militia slowly waned by 2006 due to the increased amount of sectarian 
violence and the inability of Iraqi and U.S. security forces to prevent it.  This also 
resulted in greater revenge killings by militia radicals who felt the need to retaliate 
against other non-Shia groups out of revenge.  For example, in 2007 “more than 220 
people were killed … as Sunni Arab militants unleashed suicide bombers and gunfire on 
the Shia pilgrims who converged in Karbala to mark the death of Imam Hussein, a 
grandson of the prophet Muhammad,” because Moqtada al-Sadr decided not to use the 
Mahdi Militia as a security force to protect the millions of Shia pilgrims who descended 
upon the holy city of Karbala for this annual religious ceremony.167  This was followed 
by an unspecified increase in the number Sunnis killed execution-style; the signature of 
Shia extremist groups.   
Soon after taking over as the U.S. military leader in Iraq at the beginning of 2007 
General Petraeus recognized the potential to engage the Mahdi militias for purposes of 
reconciliation, suggesting that “the militia could have a policing role [noting that] 
…many countries have auxiliary police forces.”168  Nearly nine months later, General 
Petraeus reinforced this statement when in December 2007 he “applauded Shia cleric 
Moqtada al Sadr for helping, through a cease fire, to reduce violent attacks in Iraq by 60 
percent since June.”169 
A number of cities in Southern Iraq, including Karbala are heavily influenced by 
both the Mahdi Militia and the Badr Organization.  In these cities, the U.S. military non-
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engagement strategy, with its refusal to embrace the positive contributions they could 
make to local security, has contributed to a power struggle over who will control the 
areas after the departure of Coalition forces.  In August 2007, clashes between the Badr 
Organization and the Mahdi Militia over political control of Karbala led to the death of 
approximately 50 people.170  Therefore, the likelihood of ongoing security when U.S. 
forces withdraw is even higher in these areas than elsewhere as a result of inter-militia 
power struggles. 
The question also arises as to whether the unwillingness by U.S. military forces to 
engage Shia militias correlates to an increase or decrease in number of attacks by them.  
For example, operations conducted by the commander of Multinational Division Center 
have primarily focused on defeating Shia extremists (groups supported by Iran) through 
kinetic operations designed to eliminate enemy leaders, munitions and their ability to 
train.171  The number of attacks has fallen 55 percent since June 2007, but much of this 
can be attributed to the U.S. military’s temporary increase of 20,000 soldiers that will 
only last through mid-2008.  Even with the temporary increase in soldiers, the decline is 
less than the 70% drop witnessed in Anbar province prior to the U.S. troop surge.172 
Although there is no doubt that military operations are needed to eliminate these 
elements, the continued failure to engaging local militia groups who, in concert with Iraqi 
security forces, could contributed significantly to local security and stability after the 
departure of U.S. forces in March 2008, means that these gains are likely to be 
temporary. 
7. Militia Responses to U.S. Non-engagement Strategy I: Criminalization 
In the fall of 2006, as the strategy of engagement was unfolding in Anbar 
province, the U.S. military initiated a reinvigorated effort to reduce militia influence in 
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Shia areas through an aggressive campaign of tactically precise operations to arrest or 
eliminate senior militia commanders.  These efforts had significant tactical success, but 
the effect was to create a vacuum of power that has been filled by immature and 
incompetent junior members, who have turned to criminal activity.  Whereas the Mahdi 
Militia was formerly recognized as a group that protected local neighborhoods from 
Sunni insurgents, and also doubled as “helpers, [who brought] cooking gas and other 
necessities to needy families,” now many militia members are nothing more than young 
criminal thugs.173  Even militia political offices known as Sadr Bureaus (located in most 
Shia dominated cities) recognize the rise of illegal activities.  One Sadr Bureau 
representative from Shuala, described the recent wave of kidnapping, robbery and murder 
as “the work of criminals who merely call themselves Mahdi Army members.”174  Many 
young fighters, who do not have a clear understanding of what the militia is supposed to 
stand for, now use the name to pursue criminal activities.  These activities involve 
profiting from the sales of vehicles and residences of the deceased and displaced.  “Now 
its young guys – no religion, no red lines,” according to a 40 year-old Shia named Abbas 
who lives in Southern Baghdad.  “They are kids with guns, who have cars and money.  
Being kids, they are tempted by all of this,” said another Shia resident who lives in the 
town of Topchi in Western Baghdad.175  A former militia member told a reporter in late 
2007: “Don’t call it the Mahdi Army.  It was the Mahdi Army when people in it had a 
conscience.”176 As a result of this disintegration, a schism has developed between the 
Mahdi Militia and the Shia community, and residents have become more reliant upon 
U.S. forces for security as the “surge” strategy increased the number of U.S. forces on the 
ground.  U.S. Army Major Mark Brady, who works with the National Division-Baghdad 
Reconciliation and Engagement Cell, states that “something has got to be not right if they 
are going to risk calling tips hot line or approaching a Joint Security Station (American 
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neighborhood minibuses).”177  Indeed, the number of accurate tips that Sheiks from the 
Shia community have provided the American military has skyrocketed since September 
2007.   For example, in late October 2007, the U.S. military launched three separate raids 
against Shia “criminals” in the Mahdi Militia stronghold of Sadr City that were 
reportedly “specializing in kidnapping operations.”178  The raids resulted in the killing of 
49 suspected criminals, but also led to the deaths of women, children, and the elderly 
according to Abdul Mehdi al Muteyri, an official of the Sadr Bureau who lashed out 
against that attacks by stating these unilateral attacks further demonstrate “the 
indiscriminate monstrosity…on this crowded area.”179  Although, this is an effective 
strategy in tactically removing enemy combatants, the question of whether the second 
and third order effects of such unilateral, kinetic operations leave more to be desired than 
gained.  This suggests that if Shia militias were integrated into overall security plan 
(similar to the new security plan in Anbar) they could serve as an intermediary between 
occupation forces and support the Iraqi police while reducing the level of collateral 
damage that results from a major military raid. The strategy of non-engagement towards a 
popular militia that has a powerful influence over the local neighborhood forces the U.S. 
military to defend actions now recognized by the locals as “barbaric,” while 
simultaneously denying that innocent civilians were killed.  Many of these kidnapping 
operations threaten local communities and are opposed by the militias, but U.S. 
opposition to the militia prevents the militia from attempting to respond to them, where 
engagement on an issue of mutual concern would likely lead to a much more effective 
response, less collateral damage, and greater local security and stability.    
On the surface then, the targeted tactical strikes appear to have been successful:  
the Mahdi Militia has been significantly weakened and stripped of much of its popular 
support.  But the weakening of the militia has resulted in greater criminal activity and 
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instability at the local level.   How then does this support the coalition’s overall objective 
of reducing its footprint?  If U.S. forces are pulled back, who will provide local security?  
The fundamental issue of local security, omnipresent since the fall of Saddam, remains 
unaddressed in the Shia areas of Iraq.  The popular de-legitimizing effects of the tactical 
decapitation has only reinforced the destabilizing effects of the U.S. refusal to recognize 
the legitimacy of Shia militias in the first place, increasing the likelihood of exacerbated 
instability in areas where the U.S. military reduces its footprint -- either because it must 
transition authority to unprepared governmental security forces or because it can no 
longer sustain troop levels associated with the temporary “surge” strategy.  The potential 
for instability remains high if the U.S. is left with no option other than to hand 
responsibility for local security over to Iraqi Security forces who remain ill prepared, and 
whom the local populace refuses to trust.  According to a report submitted by an 
independent commission that assessed state of security forces over the summer of 2007 
noted that the Iraqi Police Service “is incapable today of providing security at a level 
sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence” whereas 
the National Police have proven to be “operationally ineffective, and sectarianism in 
these units may fundamentally undermine their ability to provide security.  [In sum] The 
force is not viable in its current form.”180 
8. Militia Responses to U.S. Non-engagement Strategy II: 
Externalization 
The U.S. strategy for achieving stability clearly favors greater emphasis placed on 
U.S. military forces and poorly trained, dishonest, state security forces leading to greater 
stability in the long run and allowing the U.S. to reduce its force levels in the foreseeable 
future.  This scenario presents a number of problems.  First, U.S. and Iraqi government 
efforts to eliminate local militia groups without providing as trustworthy, sustainable 
security force to fill their role will likely lead to neighborhoods being more susceptible to 
terrorist influence, crime and violence.  Second, militias perceived as legitimate by the 
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local communities have been characterized by the U.S. and Iraqi leadership as bands of 
outlaws threatening U.S. and Iraqi security.  This exacerbates the inability of the Iraqi 
government and U.S. military to positively influence the local community, as insecurity 
grows while prominent members of the community that have served as local protectorates 
are vilified.  This has led much of the Shia population that was formerly protected by the 
militia to see the government as not only untrustworthy, but a “threat to their existence as 
well.”181 
The U.S. policy regarding the dissolution of Shia militias (as per CPA Order 91, 
June 2004) has been counter-productive to the future stability of Iraq.  Evidence suggests 
that Iranian sponsored groups have gladly accepted the role with training, funding and 
equipping Shia militias that are similar in fashion to the strategy that U.S. forces taken in 
training, equipping and funding Sunni militias to assume a greater role in combating 
insurgents groups, specifically al Qaeda, at the local level. In November 2007, Rear 
Admiral Gregory Smith a senior U.S. military spokesman stated that “Iran has been the 
principal supplier of weapons, arms, training and funding of many militia groups.”182  
This suggest that the U.S. strategy towards Shia militias can be attributed to proliferation 
of dangerous factions and splinter militia cells that have turned to external states for 
funding and training, which can also be attributed to increased sectarian tension and 
violence.   
Evidence in Shia-dominated cities also suggests that Shia militias are increasingly 
influenced by external actors.  Shia militia strongholds of Karbala and Najaf are rarely 
patrolled by U.S. forces any more.  The majority of U.S. forces are deployed in and 
around Baghdad leaving only a small U.S. military contingent to conducts short visits 
with local officials without being able to confirm the presence of Iranian influence.  Yet 
U.S. intelligence reports suggests that these cities are where the elite Iranian military 
force know as the Revolutionary Guard has “opened training camps in the area for Iraqi 
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guerillas”183 to allow “Shia militants [to] gather, train and arm themselves…for attacks 
against U.S. forces farther north.”184  In November 2007, U.S. Army Colonel Donald 
Farris who is in charge of the notoriously dominated area of Baghdad called Sadr City 
and Adhamiya said that “there has been no decline in the operations of Shi’ite extremist 
groups or the support they receive from Iran in weapons, funding, or training.”185  
Colonel Farris recognizes that the 2004 cease-fire with the Mahdi Militia is still in effect, 
but that the “special groups” that evolved from the militia outside of U.S., Iraqi, and 
Sadr’s oversight have continued their operations.  Two Iraqis recently captured by his 
forces “admitted to receiving training in Iran and [are] acting as agents for a group in 
Iran.”186  Recent evidence highlighting increase in number of Iranian made roadside 
bombs known as explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) found in Colonel Farris’ area of 
operations also suggest that extremist militias are gaining strength and continuing to turn 
to Iran for support.  Nine EFPs were either discovered or employed in October 2007 
compared to seven in May 2007.187  These are just a few examples of how militias 
initially created to support and secure local neighborhoods, outlawed by U.S. policy-
makers turned to Iran.  Unfortunately this has allowed for the negative influence of 
outside actors like Iran to employ a strategy of engagement, increase the number of 
extremist groups with nefarious intentions while simultaneously destabilizing the positive 
influence of Shia militias which has led to a more threatening security environment for 
U.S. forces, Iraqi forces and local residents.  This evidence makes it difficult to ignore the 
unwillingness by U.S. decision-makers to engage and co-opt Shia militias like the Mahdi 
Army and how that may have also prevented extremist members formerly tied to militias 
from seeking and accepting support from Iranian military units. 
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Figure 7.   Iraqi Interpreter Holding the back plate of an Incoherent Spray 
Explosively Formed Penetrator188 
 
9. Another Opening to Engagement 
Moqtada al Sadr and the U.S. have the same goal: for the U.S. to reduce its 
military footprint as soon as possible and ultimately leave altogether leaving behind a 
unified and stable Iraq with a functioning government.  Unlike many of the Iraqi 
insurgents who have risen up against the U.S. occupation, al Sadr’s militia has supported 
the Iraqi government since 2005.  This support is reflected in the participation of Sadr’s 
party, the United Iraqi Alliance in the government.  This does not mean that 
uncooperative militias are unwilling to negotiate a solution for stability.  For example, in 
September 2007, Finland held a secret peace seminar led by the Finnish President Martti 
Ahtisaari, which included representatives of Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr and one of the 
largest Sunni political groups led by Adnan al Dulaimi.  The seminar was held for rival 
factions so they could “examine how lessons learned from peace processes in South 
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Africa and Northern Ireland could be applied to Iraq.”189  Moqtada al Sadr also stated 
that in August 2007 that he “would welcome a planned expansion of the United Nations 
mission in Iraq if it was designed to help Iraqis rebuild their country.”190  This suggests a 
willingness by Sadr to be part of the solution in Iraq, and perhaps to work with the U.S. 
toward that end. 
 
Figure 8.   Lieutenant Colonel Gary Luck Jr., Commander of Third Battalion, 
Fifteenth Infantry Regiment Shakes Hands with Sheiks from Sadr City191 
 
Al Sadr also suspended his militia activities for six months beginning in August 
2006 to help create a favorable environment for reconciliation talks.  According to Sadr 
aide Sheik Hazim al Araji, the suspension was also intended to “rehabilitate [the militia] 
in a way that will safeguard its ideological image.”192  The suspension of violence 
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explicitly included U.S. forces.  This highlighted Sadr’s willingness to cooperate with US 
forces to rehabilitate the Mahdi Militia so that it can return to protecting local 
communities, while expelling criminal and extremists elements “who had used the group 
as a cover for killings and other crimes.”193  The plan, according to Qusay Abdul Wahab, 
an Iraqi politician and supporter of al Sadr, was that “those who do not obey the Sadr 
office will surface.  The Iraqi security forces will go after them,” and it would be 
acceptable for U.S. forces to do the same.  A Mahdi Militia street commander from Sadr 
City underlined the willingness to cooperate with the U.S. by stating that “anyone who 
fights the Americans now is not from the Mahdi Army.  Moqtada al Sadr sent this order 
to freeze the Mahdi Army for just one reason: to distinguish between good and bad 
Mahdi Army members.”194 Furthermore, Sadr demonstrated a willingness to actively 
pursue extremists who were destabilizing local communities by stating that “they [Mahdi 
Militia] recently captured 10 Iranians with Al Qaeda operatives in eastern Diyala 
province and punished them.”  The militia commander then stated that his forces simple 
dealt with them, smiling and refusing to say what they had done, implies that the captured 
element had been executed.195  Yet there is still no cooperation between the militia and 
U.S. forces, limiting the potential positive impact on stability of these initiatives.  
However, this is some indication that the U.S. may finally be considering a 
change in strategy with respect to the Mahdi Militia.  In his testimony to Congress on 
September 11, 2007 General Petraeus hinted at an opening vis-à-vis Shia militias when 
he said: “you’re not going to kill or capture all of the Sadr militia anymore than we are 
going to kill or capture all the insurgents in Iraq.”196  Debates have also arisen inside the 
White House over whether it should continue to pursue a defeat strategy or consider the 
feasibility of engagement.  Given the increased number shootouts and bombings by 
members of militia splinter cells, the willingness to negotiate by both the U.S. military 
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and militia moderates has grown.197  Finally, there are reports of small contingents of 
U.S. military and moderate militia members already negotiating.  U.S. Army officials 
responsible for West Baghdad “have extended their hand to the Jaish al Mahdi [Arabic 
name for the Mahdi Militia].”198  Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Patrick Frank, the officer 
responsible for initiating these negotiations asserted: “We have to craft a way ahead.  We 
have to find a workable solution with the community leaders, religious leaders, and 
essentially the local political leaders within Jaish al Mahdi.”199  One U.S. diplomat 
recognized that the same thing occurred with the Sunni’s although it took over a year and 
a half to achieve proven levels of stability that it has. And it paid off.  According to LTC 
Franks there was a reduction of violence in his area of operations after both sides agreed 
to a limit in military operations.  The street commander agreed to suspend attacks for two 
weeks in conjunction with an order by Moqtada al Sadr to suspend militia activities for 
six months (that was announced two weeks previously) and the U.S. military agreed to a 
reduction of raids in their district.200  It remains to be seen whether LTC Frank’s strategy 
will be an exception to the rule, or whether it will be adopted and employed by the other 
U.S. military units that interact with Shia militias or even adopted as policy by the U.S. 
military and/or political leadership. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the effects of the U.S. strategy towards militias in three 
different areas of Iraq between 2003 and 2007.  The analysis shows a consistent 
correlation between high levels of conflict and instability and a U.S. strategy of non-
engagement toward militias.  From the beginning of the invasion, U.S. policy endorsed 
the existence and operation of the Kurdish Peshmerga, and they have proven an effective 
partner, consistently maintaining peace and stability and even facilitating prosperity 
during tumultuous periods of instability since 2003.  More recently, the U.S. decision to 
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endorse Sunni militias in the Anbar province has resulted in one of Iraq’s most dangerous 
provinces becoming one of its safest in a matter of months.  In both instances, 
engagement has led to improved security, governance and economic performance.  
Evidence from the Shia areas suggests that a strategy of engagement would likely have 
similar effects there as well.  Overall stabilization has little hope of success if the U.S. 
engagement policy with respect to militias is not implemented fairly and equally towards 
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III. CASE STUDY- THE PALESTINE MANDATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During their occupation of Palestine from 1917 to 1948, the British tested a 
number of different strategies vis-à-vis indigenous militia forces.  This chapter provides a 
within case analysis much as the previous chapter did for Iraq.  The next chapter will then 
present a comparative analysis of the two cases.  In the early years of the occupation, the 
British used strategies of engagement toward militias and later changed course and 
adopted a strategy of non-engagement that ultimately resulted in the inability of the 
British to maintain a stable environment.  The chapter shows that the policy of 
engagement ultimately allowed the Jewish community to establish an effective and 
organized government, which allowed the United Nations to transfer responsibilities for 
security to Jewish militias after Great Britain relinquished responsibility for the Palestine 
Mandate. 
As in the previous chapter, this chapter begins with the historical background 
necessary to understand the occupation in general.  This is followed by a section 
analyzing the effects of engagement strategies employed by the British military on 
stability in Palestine, and then a section analyzing the effects of polices of non-
engagement employed from 1945 to 1948 on stability and Britain’s ability to govern 
Palestine.  Lastly, the chapter assesses the impact of United Nations policy towards 
militias in Palestine during the transition to sovereignty on Jewish militias and the 
establishment of a functioning Israeli government and military. 
B. BACKGROUND 
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine 
of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best 
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object…201 
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With the end of World War I came responsibility for territories to be divided 
amongst the victors.  Britain recognized the strategic importance of Palestine from a 
military standpoint and made every effort to ensure that it would not fall into French 
hands after the war.202  The Tripartite Sykes-Picot Agreement for the Partition of the 
Ottoman Empire, negotiated secretly by the Secretary of the British War Cabinet Sir 
Mark Sykes and the French representative Georges Picot in 1916, established the 
framework for French and British annexation of “Asiatic portions of the Ottoman 
Empire” after Allied victory.203  It provided for French control of Lebanon and Syria, 
independence for Saudi Arabia and Yemen, British control of Iraq and Trans-Jordan, and 
international administration of Palestine pending future discussions with the Sherif of 
Mecca, Russia, and other allies.204  The British formally occupied Palestine on December 
11, 1917 when General Allenby entered Jerusalem, promising to respect and protect all 
citizens (regardless of religion) under the newly established military government.  World 
War I had left Palestine in ruins.  Nearly a quarter of the population had died in battle.  
Both the Arab and Jewish populations were starving, plague was rampant, and the 
economy was near collapse.205 
On November 2, 1917 the Balfour Declaration officially established a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine, in recognition of the support Allied forces had received from the 
Jewish diaspora during one of their lowest points in World War I.206  After the U.S. 
Congress voted to declare war against Germany on April 6, 1917 that was partially 
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influenced by American Jewish lobbying, the British government issued a Statement of 
War Aims in the Near East, which listed five points in support of Jewish national 
objectives that would serve as the basis of the Balfour Declaration.207 
 
 
Figure 9.   Demographic Establishment of Palestine in 1920208 
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Roughly three years later, on August 10, 1920, Turkey officially ceded its 
authority over Palestine to the League of Nations.  The League then passed sovereign 
jurisdiction of Palestine to Great Britain in the form of a League of Nations Mandate. 209   
By 1920, Arab grievances had percolated over issues such as immigration, land 
ownership, establishment of a Jewish government, and religious differences.  This 
resulted in a number of violent attacks against the Yishuv (Jewish settlements) with little 
intervention from thinly spread British security forces.  Jews began to realize that they 
could not rely on the British government or local Arab police to protect them.  Thus they 
began to look to the political arm of the Jewish community for local security. 
The Zionist Commission, later know as the Jewish (Executive) Agency, 
represented the interests of Jewish immigrants Palestine.  Established in March 1918 by 
the Dr. Chaim Weizman, it was designed “to form a link between the British authorities 
and the Jewish population of Palestine and to help in establishing friendly relations with 
the Arabs and other non-Jewish communities.”210  However, it was not officially 
recognized until the League of Nations Mandate of 1922 stated that 
An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the 
purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine 
in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment 
of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in 
Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist 
and take part in the development of the country.211    
In response to increasing insecurity, the Jewish Agency oversaw the establishment of the 
Haganah militia in 1920.  Haganah would continue operating as a militia force from 1920 
to 1948 and as the military arm of the Jewish Agency.  The more radical Irgun Zvai 
Leumi militia broke off from it in 1931, as did the Stern Gang (also known as Lehi and 
the Stern Group) in 1940.  At independence in 1948 Haganah would become the Israeli 
Defense Force.  
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The British issued a White Paper in 1922 (the Churchill Memorandum), which 
reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration while attempting to limit future Jewish immigration 
and establish a framework for fair representation of the Arab population, culture and 
language in Palestine.  The White Paper was grudgingly accepted by the Jewish Agency 
in the hope that it would lead Palestinian Arabs to accept the Balfour Declaration.  
However, Palestinian Arabs did not accept the Declaration, and the White Paper of 1922 
then became a source of strain in relations between the Jewish population and the 
occupying military.212 
Prior to 1936, there was a limited policy of engagement between Jewish militias 
and British forces stationed in Palestine.  However, Britain would be forced to rely 
heavily on indigenous security forces in Palestine shortly after their occupation.  After 
World War I, Britain’s was thinly spread throughout the Middle East.  They faced a 
massive draw down of military forces while simultaneously acquiring large swaths of 
terrain that resulted from post-World War I treaties.  Since Palestine was just a 
microcosm of their territorial gains, the British were immediately faced with overcoming 
a shortage of personnel needed to maintain security between the Arab and Jewish 
population.   
The continued inability of the British government to find a solution that was 
acceptable to both the Arab and Jewish communities ultimately led to an Arab insurgency 
that lasted from1936 to 1939.  In August 1936 the British government established the 
Peel Commission to “ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances.”  In July 1937 
it recommended a partition of Palestine between the Arab and Jewish populations.213  
This was rejected by Palestinian Arabs and hotly debated by Jews. Meanwhile, the 
British government concluded that the financial and administrative difficulties were so 
great that it could not be implemented.214  Instead, it issued the MacDonald White Paper 
in May 1939, limiting Jewish immigration, land ownership and the right to call Palestine 
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a national homeland (as it was described in the 1917 Balfour Declaration).215  This was 
again rejected by both the Jewish and Arab populations.  It also served as a point of 
contention between British military forces and Jewish militias after 1945. However, the 
onslaught of World War II in 1939 overshadowed the politics of Palestine.  The British 
were not in the position to enforce the MacDonald White Paper, and the Arab and Jewish 
communities both realized the need to support Great Britain in defending Palestine 
against attacks from Axis powers.  As a result, by 1941, the British had trained over 
16,000 Jewish militiamen to conduct military operations against the Axis powers.216  
When World War II began to wind down in 1944 the British began to experience an 
increase in attacks throughout Palestine, including the assassination of Lord Moyne, the 
British Minister of State on November 6, 1944 by the Stern Gang.  However, the newly 
elected British Labour Party continued to endorse the 1939 MacDonald White Paper.  
This directly impacted the Haganah’s decision to unite with the Irgun and Stern Gang in 
establishing the United Resistance (UR) to resist anti-Jewish policies of the British 
government in Palestine.   The British continued to maintain policies limiting Jewish 
immigration.  By 1945, there were over 100,000 British soldiers deployed to Palestine, 
one-tenth of Britain’s armed force, at a cost of over 40 million pounds a year. The British 
military was faced with terrorist attacks conducted by the Jewish militias, especially the 
Irgun and Stern Gang.  This was a period of intense counter insurgency operations 
consisting of cordon and searches, individual and mass arrests, trials, incarcerations, 
hangings and even death squads, all of which had absolutely no positive impact on 
stability.217  British policies of non-engagement with the militias led to increased 
isolation from the population, which led to an increase in attacks against British 
occupation forces.  They also failed to find a solution for peace with the Arab and Jewish 
communities during the last three years of their occupation.  Ultimately this resulted in 
their failure to maintain control.  In 1948, with British casualties increasing, the security 
situation worsening, and Great Britain unable to achieve an agreement with Palestinian 
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Arabs or Jews, the future of Palestine was turned over to the United Nations.  On 
November 29, 1947 the U.N. voted to partition Palestine.  The following day, the British 
announced their plan for withdrawal from Palestine no later than August 1948.  The 
mandate was officially terminated on May 15, 1948.  Immediately following, David Ben-
Gurion officially announced the creation of Israel.218 
1. 1920-1936 Limited Engagement 
Engagement of the Jewish militias by the British was limited in scope in this 
period due to the limited and localized operations of the Haganah militia.  British policy 
vis-à-vis the Haganah militia is succinctly described by Winston Churchill who told 
Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the Jewish Agency, in July 1921: “we don’t mind it, but 
don’t speak of it.”219  Until 1936, officials in Palestine were reluctant to recognize any 
security element other than British security forces.  The considered, but ultimately 
abandoned, the idea of establishing a mixed defense force, concluding that it would lead 
to civil war after they witnessed a number of clashes between Arabs and Haganah in May 
1921.220  In addition, the security situation was generally so calm in 1921, that the British 
were able to drastically reduce the number of soldiers deployed to Palestine from 25,000 
to 7,000 during the disturbances of 1921, and then to a garrison of 2,800 and one para-
military unit of British Gendarmerie by the end of the year.  Control of the forces was 
also transferred from the British War Office to the Air Ministry at that time.  However, 
by 1926 it had become clear that British defense forces had been reduced so much that 
they could barely provide security for themselves, let alone the civilian population.  
Reduced troop levels and continuing unwillingness of British decision-makers to 
cooperate with Jewish militias led to a major outbreak of violence and instability of 1929.   
Established after World War I from a group known as Hashomer (Watchmen), the 
Haganah evolved as a defense force to protect Jewish settlements in Palestine.  Prior to 
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the Arab uprising in 1929 the Haganah consisted of small unorganized pockets of local 
civilians brought together with the intent of protecting their families and neighborhoods 
in a relatively stable environment.221  The Arab uprising of 1929 convinced the Jewish 
Agency that it needed a more professional security force, since British security forces had 
been unable to provide adequate protection to the Jewish settlements.  At this time 
Haganah quietly began acquiring military equipment and providing professional training 
to its volunteers.222  Ben-Gurion recounts how the Haganah evolved in the face of 
security threats posed by local Arabs. 
Unlike Hashomer, the Haganah was based not on professional watchmen 
but on volunteers who trained intermittingly and were subject to less strict 
discipline than was the case in Hashomer.  The Haganah groups acted as 
local defense forces when necessary, rather than as units subordinate to a 
central authority.  As Arab terror increased, the Haganah steadily 
developed into a more centralized body, with a National Command 
responsible for the coordination of defense needs on a countrywide 
basis.223 
The British response to the initial transformation of the Haganah was slow, not 
taking form until the second round of violence starting in 1936.  From 1929 to 1936 the 
British remained indecisive with how to engage the Haganah and continued to turn a 
blind eye towards the formation, training and development of Jewish militias and their 
need to protect their communities.  Since the British were unwilling to engage the 
Haganah, they were unaware that the creation of a more radical militia, the Irgun Beth, 
that would later serve as the foundation for the Irgun after their formation in 1937.  This 
evidence suggests that more radical Jewish militias could have either been prevented or 
marginalized if the British had taken a more active role with the engagement of Jewish 
militias during this seven year period of Palestinian occupation. 
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C. STRATEGIES OF ENGAGEMENT 
During the occupation the British initially adopted a strategy of engagement vis-à-
vis Jewish militias.  The following section will examine three periods of cooperation with 
the Haganah and assess the effects of engagement on stability.   The first period deals 
with the recognition and endorsement of Jewish militias as a legitimate security apparatus 
during the Arab insurgency of 1936 to 1939.   The groups that were that were established 
and supported by the British military were known as the Jewish Settlement Police and 
Special Night Squads and staffed by members of the Haganah during this time period.  
The next section examines the effects of Britain’s strategy of engagement with the 
Haganah and their endorsement of a special Jewish military unit known as the Palmach, 
which was created to reinforce the British military against the threat of invasion during 
World War II.  The last section examines a strategy of cooperation between the British 
military and Haganah in reducing the threat of violence in the period after the 
assassination of Lord Moyne in 1944. 
1. Insurgency of 1936-1939 
From 1936 to 1939 the Palestinian Arab population began to violently resist and 
demonstrate against the occupying British military and Yishuv (Jewish community) and 
against the continuing immigration of Jews into Palestine.  The resistance “consisted of a 
strike including withholding of taxes, of acts of sabotage against British forces, 
assassination of British officials, murder of Jewish civilians and murder of other 
Arabs.”224  In response, the British engaged the Haganah militia to maintain local 
security.  An official local security force known as the Jewish Settlement Police (JSP) 
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was established, and trained in techniques of low intensity conflict and counterinsurgency 
warfare.  Since the Haganah were still technically viewed by the British occupation as 
illegal, establishment of the JSP enabled the British to legally acknowledge the Haganah 
as local protectorates for Jewish communities The Haganah used the JSP as an informal 
academy, training over thirteen thousand members between 1936 and 1945, when the JSP 
was dissolved.  The British provided the JSP with a multitude of supplies including 
weapons, uniforms, and vehicles, and authorized it to control “land around Jewish 
villages.”225  This engagement facilitated the transformation of Haganah from a local 
defense force to a capable offensive force.  The Jewish Settlement Police were used to 
conduct mobile and surprise attacks against insurgents in conjunction with the British 
military.226  The JSP ranks swelled to over 16,000 by 1940, and were critical in 
augmenting British security forces while increasing security and stability in Jewish 
communities.227   
The policy of co-opting Jewish militias to assume a greater role in performing 
local security functions was not accepted by everyone in the British military.  Many 
Senior British military officers such as General Archibald Wavell, the commanding 
general in Palestine were well versed in conventional military tactics that were developed 
on the linear battlefields of World War I.  However, few senior officers were prepared for 
the complexities of military occupation in Palestine.  Part of these complexities involved 
the integration and cooperation with Jewish militias who were providing much needed 
security to their settlements.  The British security forces in Palestine were far to stretched 
out to provide legitimate protection to their inhabitants.  Yet, they had been unwilling to 
cooperate and share the burden of security with non-British forces, Jewish militias in 
particular until the recommendations by officers in the field that faced the Arab 
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insurgency of 1936 led to a change in this strategy.  Major Orde Wingate, a thirty-three 
year old military intelligence officer who arrived in Palestine in 1936 persuaded General 
Archibald Wavell, the Commanding General Officer of Palestine to establish Special 
Night Squads (SNS) that would be used for counter-insurgency operations.228  After 
persistent lobbying of his senior officers Wingate was allowed to study the “modus 
operandi of…Arab gangs, and in June 1938 he submitted his report, ‘Ways of Making 
His Majesty’s Forces Operate at Night with the Objective of Putting an End to the Terror 
in Northern Palestine.”229  This report led to an approval for Wingate to establish the 
SNS which consisted of forty British infantrymen, four trucks and seventy-five Jewish 
militiamen (called notrim) provided by the Haganah.  These squads were created through 
the integration of British soldiers and the Jewish Settlement Police to perform ambushes 
that were needed to stop insurgent attacks.  The employment of the SNS immediately led 
to a reduction in violence and criminal activity.  Over sixty insurgents were killed in the 
first month alone and the sabotage of the Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline which served 
as a vital economic resource for all of Palestine was drastically reduced.230  “Arson, 
deforestation, and the destruction of homes, wells, and pipelines” were limited as well.231  
Unfortunately, the policy of cooperation between Jewish militias and British forces came 
with a price paid in blood.  From 1936 to1939 there were 620 British and 2,394 Jewish 
casualties compared to 3,764 insurgents which was relatively low since British troop 
levels hovered around 50,000.232  
The Special Night Squads and Jewish Settlement Police were able to achieve 
greater tactical flexibility compared to the British military, which is an extensive 
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bureaucratic organization.  The training for Jewish militias was tactically focused at the 
squadron, company and platoon level.  Militia commanders complimented the British 
military structure very well through their capabilities to improvise and conduct 
independent operations while attached to formal militia hierarchy.  The guerilla attacks 
employed by Arab dissidents called for a militia to act “independently, quickly, and 
decisively while demonstrating a high level of flexibility;” characteristics not consistent 
with standard operating procedures within the British Army.233   
Unfortunately, General Haining, who replaced General Wavell as the 
commanding general of Palestine in 1938 “not only had reservations about the wisdom of 
the SNS policy” since it was in conflict with a questionable British policy of avoiding 
actions that could exacerbate tensions between Jews and Arabs, but also “had doubts 
about allowing a junior officer such independence of the general command.”234  He 
decided to forego further integration of British and Jewish forces in favor of a policy a 
massive intervention of British troops, and the SNS was dissolved in May 1939.  
Although the addition of more British troops did restore order temporarily, it did not 
restore reliable local security, especially after the departure of these extra troops.  Senior 
officers made sure that Wingate “was prohibited from going to Palestine for any reason 
whatever, either on duty or on leave.”235  Wingate continued to lobby for greater 
cooperation between British security forces and the Jewish military.  He even appealed to 
Winston Churchill for the establishment of a Jewish Army.  This was denied by the 
British Colonial Office, but his appeals were instrumental in the continued training of the 
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JSP “which numbered nearly 16,000 by 1941” and proved to be vital in providing much 
needed protection that over-stretched British security forces were unable to provide.236 
2. The Palmach 
Despite the tensions created between the British and the Jewish community by the 
Macdonald White Paper, they would again seek, and receive, the assistance of Jewish 
militias in 1941, this time for national rather than local security.  In 1940 German 
occupation of Palestine was a real possibility.  British forces in Palestine were not 
prepared or capable of repelling a German attack, and feared that Palestinian Arabs 
would welcome German troops in an effort to undermine the British occupation and 
Jewish Yishuv.  So the British again turned to Jewish militias for support.  In 1941 
“Cooperation” was established between the militias and British military and was aimed at 
defeating an attack by German-Italian armies invading Palestine.  This agreement 
allowed for the Jewish militias to establish an elite striking force known as the Plugot 
Mahatz, or Palmach.  “Cooperation” allowed Jewish militias to fully invest in the 
recruitment, training and funding for the Palmach, which would later deploy with British 
forces to combat Axis power on multiple fronts.237  Five examples highlight the success 
of this strategy of with a local militia. 
The first engagement cost the lives of 23 Palmach fighters and one British officer 
on May 18, 1941, all of whom perished at sea enroute to sabotaging oil refineries in Syria 
to prevent them from being used by Axis powers.  However, the British were so 
impressed with the discipline, readiness, and capabilities of the Palmach that they were 
integrated into the planning of small unit tactics of sabotage, sniper, ambush and patrol 
operations, which were to be deployed if the Germans invaded Palestine.  The British 
provided sabotage and communication training in conjunction with naval and land 
military training conducted by the Haganah.  The second engagement occurred on June 7, 
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1941 and consisted of Palmach fighters serving in critical roles alongside Australian 
vanguards during the attack of Syria and Lebanon.  The Palmach fighters were broken 
down into thirteen different teams tasked for dangerous missions that included disrupting 
communication, seizure of key terrain and routes, and serving as lead navigators for 
Allied armies behind enemy lines.  Palmach operations would continue in Syria and 
Lebanon until March 1943 and consisted of missions that involved gathering intelligence, 
disseminating propaganda and disrupting key infrastructure.  The fourth example is the 
establishment of the Mishmar Ha’emek training camp, which was run jointly by the 
British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Haganah leadership.  The camp was 
specifically designed to train Palmach fighters in patrolling, sniper operations, and 
sabotage.  The British provided trainers, financial support, maintenance assistance and 
food.  By the conclusion of training in June 1942, nearly 1100 Palmach fighters were 
jointly trained by British military and Haganah militiamen.  This served as a critical 
foundation for the professional Palmach force.  The fifth example encompasses a plan 
between the British military and Haganah called the Northern Plan.  By June 1942 the 
Axis powers were threatening to overrun British forces near Egypt.  The plan entailed 
supporting the British retreat from Palestine while consolidating Jewish communities in 
mountainous and dense housing in Haifa, Mount Carmel, the Bay of Haifa and part of the 
Zvulun Valley.  Once consolidated the Jewish fighters would be required to repel Axis 
attacks until the British military was able to regroup and move back to Palestine to 
reinforce the Jewish militias.238 
In sum, the engagement strategy that the British military used with the Palmach 
demonstrates that engagement can succeed in traditional military operations at the 
national level as well as in community defense at the local level.  However, the British 
failed to capitalize on what they had initiated.  Once the threat of Axis occupation 
receded, the British military strategy of engagement receded as well.  Additionally, the 
British government’s policy of uphold the MacDonald White Paper of 1939 would 
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undermine the willingness of the Jewish militias to cooperate with British forces absent 
the threat of Nazi Germany.  Indeed, the Haganah went underground in 1945 and began 
movement of resistance against the British.  The British response was an ultimately 
unsuccessful strategy of defeating Haganah and the other Jewish militias. 
3. The Season 
The Jewish Agency and the Haganah made an effort to maintain a diplomatic 
relationship with the British after the announcement of the MacDonald White Paper in 
1939.  However, the Irgun and Stern Gang militias were always more inclined to oppose 
the British occupation.  This inclination to resist was held in check until the outcome of 
World War II began to be clear.  Then, on February 1, 1944, the Irgun and Stern Gang 
formally announced a revolt against British, calling upon the Jewish community to rise 
against the tyranny of the British occupation.  The Haganah continued its policy of 
facilitating British defeat of Nazi Germany by standing down.  It opposed resistance by 
the more radical groups on those grounds, as well as out of concern that the resistance 
would undermine important vestiges of support for the Jewish state from powerful British 
leaders, such as Winston Churchill.  From February to September 1944 Irgun and the 
Stern Gang bombed immigration offices, British tax offices, intelligence and police 
buildings (which were highly fortified), seized a government broadcasting station, and 
assassinated a number of British policemen.239  Haganah threw its support behind British 
efforts to contain the more radical militias.  In September 1944, Moshe Sneh, the 
commander of Haganah along with another Haganah leader, Eliyahu Golomb, 
participated in two meetings with Menahem Begin, the leader of the Irgun.  The Haganah 
commanders told Begin that the actions of the Irgun and Stern Gang were not sanctioned 
by the Jewish community, Haganah or the Jewish Agency, and ordered him to cease the 
attacks immediately or face civil war and military elimination.240  Begin attempted to 
dissuade the Haganah leaders for two months from attacking a fellow Jewish militia, but 
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the assassination of Lord Moyne by members of the Stern Gang resulted in immediate 
offensive actions by Haganah against both the Stern Gang and the Irgun.   
Moyne’s assassination in Cairo on November 6, 1944 dealt a major blow to 
ongoing negotiations between British and the Haganah over their possible integration as a 
legitimate security force in conjunction with the British occupation.  Soon after the 
assassination, Winston Churchill proclaimed: “If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the 
smoke of assassins’ pistols and our labours for its future are to produce a new set of 
gangsters…many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so 
consistently and so long in the past.”241  The Haganah also immediately condemned the 
assassination and produced a plan, which involved the collaboration with British police 
and military, to capture members of the Irgun and Stern Gang.  The Haganah’s 
intelligence branch, the Shai, amassed over 250 names, and the Palmach was employed to 
kidnap suspects and turn them over to British authorities.  The Jewish Agency also 
established a Department of Special Assignments designed to cooperate with the British 
Intelligence in collecting information on suspected Irgun members.  The Season drew to a 
close in March 1945, when the Haganah abandoned the kidnapping of Irgun and Stern 
Gang members in response to condemnation by the Jewish community. Joint British-
Haganah operations of the Hunting Season resulted in the detention of over 1,000 
suspected members with hundreds deported to detention camps in Africa, while severely 
limiting offensive operations of the Irgun and Stern Gang.  This resulted in seven months 
of increased security and stability. 242  However they did not eliminate the more radical 
militias.   
D. STRATEGY OF NON-ENGAGEMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON 
STABILITY 
Britain’s Labour party, having won in the 1945 elections committed to allowing 
holocaust survivors to immigrate to Palestine without delay, reneged on its promises after 
assuming power.  This decision constituted a de facto abandonment of the British strategy 
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of engagement with militias and resulted in an immediate shift by the Haganah from a 
strategy of cooperation to resistance.  Additionally, the Labour Party’s decision indirectly 
supported the Irgun and Stern Gang’s more radical vision of resisting British occupation 
by changing the public’s perception of the two militias from “blood thirsty terrorist to 
persecuted martyr, betrayed by his brother Jew to the iniquitous British” less than six 
months after the execution of the Season.243  The decision to renege on their promises to 
the Jews in Palestine would result in greater insecurity, an unsustainable rise in British 
troop levels, and escalating costs. 
In the fall of 1945 the Haganah entered into an agreement with the Irgun and 
Stern Gang to conduct offensive operations against the British occupation.  By October 
1945 the negotiations with the Irgun and the Stern Gang were complete and the United 
Resistance (UR) was formed.244  The UR was committed to winning Israeli independence 
by military means.  As Begin states in The Revolt, the strategic intent of military action 
“was to raise the political and military costs of the continued British presence sufficiently 
to persuade them to quit.”245  Coordinated attacks began on November 1, 1945 in an 
operation called the “Night of the Trains,” which involved an attack on a major railway 
station by a joint Irgun-Stern Gang unit and the destruction of 153 different areas of rail 
and two patrol launches in the ports of Jaffa and Haifa.246  The next combined attack 
occurred in late 1945 when a joint Irgun-Stern Gang militia bypassed British security and 
emplaced explosive charges that demolished the British Intelligence office building, 
killing seven policemen.  The British Police and Intelligence Service district headquarters 
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in Jaffa was also destroyed, and a British army camp in Tel Aviv was attacked by the 
Irgun.247 The UR coordinated its next attack against the airfields in Palestine in February, 
1946.  The “Night of the Airfields” consisted of a joint Irgun-Stern Gang attack on two 
airfields approximately seven kilometers apart.  Despite robust British security measures, 
UR coordination and detailed planning prevented the British from responding from their 
barracks across the street with suppressive fire.  This resulted in the loss of nearly twenty 
British military aircraft.  The Haganah conducted offensive operations against targets 
related to immigration, as it had in the past, but now also targeted British police and 
military.  In February 1946 it raided the mobile police force in three different locations, 
as well as coast guard stations and radar installations.  The Irgun staged its largest attack, 
targeting the southern railway network while the Stern Gang attacked an important bridge 
along a British resupply route south of the town of Acre on April 2. 1946.  The Irgun was 
successful in immobilizing the railway network and blowing up the bridges.  Although 31 
Irgun militiamen, including respected commanders, were arrested, its ability to conduct a 
large scale operation was recognized by local and international media.248  This attack was 
compounded by one of the largest (and the last) Haganah attacks against the British 
infrastructure on June 17, 1945.  In the “Night of the Bridges,” the Haganah’s elite 
Palmach units were stationed in each of four cardinal locations of the country.  Eleven 
bridges linking Palestine to surrounding countries were destroyed, effectively cutting off 
the British from ground reinforcements.   
The British were faced with a paradox of sorts.  Although they needed to defeat 
the militias’ resistance to the occupation, they also needed to sustain the militias’ role as 
local security providers since they did not have the support of the British population or 
the military capability to sustain the current force levels for much longer.  Therefore they 
responded to the UR offensive by implementing a countrywide curfew and capturing over 
100 militiamen, killing four and wounding 18 as a precursor to their largest operation 
which nearly brought the United Resistance to a standstill.  The British military felt that a 
major military operation was needed to “break the military strength of the Yishuv [Jewish 
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community], the elite Palmach Force of the Haganah, and to stifle the activist leaders, in 
order, it was hoped, to pave the way for moderate leaders who would be willing to 
cooperate with the [British Mandate].”249  By targeting the Palmach specifically, the 
British hoped that the Haganah would recognize that a military operation was intended to 
stop offensive actions of the militia and not the Haganah’s tradition role as a self defense 
force.   In Operation Agatha, approximately 17,000 British participated in a two week 
cordon and search military operation throughout Palestine.  They arrested over 2,700 
people and confiscated massive amounts of documents, plans, weapons, and materiel 
from multiple locations.  This also enabled British authorities to officially link David 
Ben-Gurion and the Jewish Agency to the military activities of the UR militia.250 
Unfortunately, the military operation did not achieve the intended effects that the British 
military desired. 
In response to Operation Agatha, the UR bombed the British government offices 
in the left wing of the King David Hotel, killing 28 Britons, 41 Arabs, 17 Jews, and five 
others – all civilians.251  The large number of casualties was unexpected.   Irgun stated 
that they had warned the British, the French consulate across the street, and the Palestine 
Post prior to the detonation.  Although the bombing of the King David Hotel was 
successful, the resort to terrorist tactics shocked the Jewish community and its leadership, 
and undermined support for the UR. Even though the Haganah was involved in the 
planning of the bombing as a response to Operation Agatha, the Irgun accepted full 
responsibility at the request of the Haganah due to the condemnation by David Ben-
Gurion, other leaders of the Jewish Agency, and British population and Jewish 
community.  The Irgun issued a statement a year later attempting to highlight the truth of 
the matter, however it had no effect and they were still strongly condemned by the British 
and Hebrew press.252  As a result of the bombing, moderates in the Jewish Agency 
Executive gained enough strength to abolish the UR on August 5, 1946, after ten months 
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of synchronized operations between the Haganah, Irgun, and Stern Gang.  The Irgun and 
Stern Gang continued to conduct military operations on their own, while the Haganah 
returned to supporting Jewish immigration and reinvigorated its earlier efforts to establish 
a Jewish state through diplomacy with Great Britain.253 
The British response to the tragedy was less than successful.  They were faced 
with two options.  First was the possibility of conducting “large scale arms searches” 
similar to Operation Agatha.  However, they realized that Operation Agatha failed to 
produce any tangible results against the UR and even helped them with pursing a decision 
to bomb the King David hotel.  They also felt that there would be a secondary effect of 
pushing Palestine over the edge into an all-out state of war which Great Britain was 
incapable of providing the large numbers of troops and equipment needed to maintain 
security in Palestine.  The 80,000 troops that were currently deployed to Palestine 
represented eight percent of their force structure and had placed increased strain on the 
already battered, post World War military.254  Therefore the British were left with 
implementing a myopic political solution that demoralized troops through the imposed 
military restriction while resentment for the British occupation increased.  General Sir 
Evelyn Barker, British Army Commander in Palestine issued an anti-Semitic letter 
intended “to punish Jews in a way the race dislikes as any by striking at their pockets and 
showing our contempt for them” by ordering “all Jewish places of entertainment, 
restaurants, shops and Jewish homes off-limits to British troops.255  After the letter was 
intercepted by the Irgun, it was made public immediately which assisted with countering 
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the damage done by the King David Hotel bombing and also “helped transform British 
security forces into even more of a resentful and hated enemy occupation force.”256 
Thus, from June 1946, the militias employed a two track strategy.  Haganah 
pursued the political track, with pressure for compromise from Britain being applied by 
the Irgun and Stern Gang on the military track.  Begin, the Irgun leader, saw a direct 
correlation between his attacks and British concessions.  In December 1946, two Irgun 
militiamen sentenced to prison were lashed on their backs as part of the sentence.  Begin 
responded publicly by warning the British that “you will not whip Jews in their 
homeland.  And if British authorities whip them, then British officers will be whipped 
publicly in return.”257  The following day, a British major and three NCOs received 
retaliatory lashes.  After twenty-five years of protests by the Jewish Agency, lashes were 
suddenly eliminated in Palestine.  Similarly, after three Stern Group militiamen were 
executed at the Acre prison in July 1947, the Irgun responded by hanging two British 
sergeants, creating a spiral of violence between the Jewish militias and the British 
occupation forces, who felt trapped by British policies that prevented more offensive 
operations.  After the two sergeants were hanged, British soldiers and policemen 
vandalized Jewish businesses and houses, but were met by groups of young militiamen 
with stones and fists.  Vigilante reprisals signaled that the British had nearly lost control, 
which met the exact goals of the Irgun: to make Palestine ungovernable for the British.  
In retrospect, the hanging of the sergeants served as one of the strongest signals for 
British departure from Palestine.  In the words of the Chief Secretary of the British 
Government in Palestine, Colonel Archer-Cust, “The hangings of the two British 
sergeants did more than anything to get us out of Palestine.”258 
British security forces were left in a precarious position as a result of the British 
Labour Party’s decision to renege on British commitments to the Jewish state since they 
were forced to uphold a political policy that was diametrically opposed the Jewish militia 
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vision.  The military strategy of engagement with the militias was effectively undermined 
by this policy decision.  As a result, they were forced to increase troop levels to from 
50,000 to 80,000 in the last three months of 1945 intended to fight Jewish immigration, 
reduce violence by marginalizing the UR and reestablish order by exhibiting a greater 
visual presence.  This troop increase proved insufficient and an additional 20,000 troops 
were deployed, bringing the total to 100,000, or ten percent of their total force.  This 
further strained an already exhausted forced that had returned from fighting Nazi 
Germany less than a year before and was now required to fulfill a three year obligation in 
Palestine.  For example, the Sixth Airborne Division participated in the beach landings at 
Normandy on June 6, 1944 and continued to fight Axis powers in both Europe and the 
Far East for the next year, and was then deployed to Palestine less than six months after 
World War II.259   
Unfortunately, the strategy that spelled victory in World War II paradoxically led 
to withdrawal in Palestine.  The British strategic policy of limiting Jewish immigration 
resulted in so-called tactical victories included the “repeated spectacle of immigrants, 
many of them former concentration camp inmates with numbers still tattooed on their 
arms, being manhandled, wounded, and sometimes killed by troops who sought to 
transfer them to prison camps,” which led to a global public relations disaster.260  Even 
more damaging was the demoralization of British troops after Winston Churchill accused 
them of “not knowing how to behave like men.”261  Over 170 operations similar to 
Agatha were conducted, with “25 percent bringing no results at all and only exposing 
troops to false accusations of brutality or looting.”262  Ultimately, the British strategy of 
non-engagement put them in a position were they were “damned if they ‘lost’ and twice 
damned if, as usually happened, they ‘won’ and ‘succeeded’ in restoring order, arresting 
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suspects, and even stopping immigrants from reaching their destination.”263  The British 
military was not trained to conduct what were essentially policing operations, and tended 
therefore to use conventional military tactics that were inappropriate and thus produced 
tactical successes that were strategic failures.    
During the last three years of occupation, British security forces placed greater 
emphasis on operations designed to stop militia violence against them than to provide 
local security to the Yishuv (Jewish communities). Therefore, it became incumbent upon 
the Haganah to ensure their communities were protected.  The leader of the Jewish 
Agency, Ben-Gurion divided the militia accordingly.  While the Haganah continued to 
serve as a local self-defense force for Jewish neighborhoods, the Palmach, the elite unit 
within the Haganah continued to perform offensive operations aimed at disrupting British 
security forces that interfered with the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine. 
The Jewish militias placed a much greater emphasis on providing local security for 
themselves after the British dissolved policies of engagement were essentially abandoned 
after the election of the British Labour Party in the fall of 1945.  This led their unparalleled 
support by the Yishuv (Jewish community) British security forces could no longer be trusted.  
Thus the Jewish Agency immediately enacted a policy of conscription for all “Jewish senior 
school children aged 17-18” whereas before it was optional for teenagers who had either 
completed or left school.264  These measures forced a much closer relationship with Jewish 
communities and their militias that actually resulted in a period where there were no major 
incidents of violence until the November 30, 1947, when the UN voted to partition Palestine.  
The vote was immediately followed with bouts of chaotic uprisings by the Arab community.  
In response to David Ben-Gurion’s assertion that British security forces failed to “prevent 
Arab incursions from neighboring states and, on occasion, of having prevented the Haganah 
from coming to the aid of Jews under attack,” British officials stating that “Arabs had been  
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provoked by Jewish celebrations.”265  The lack of engagement ironically prepared the 
Haganah to succeed in what would escalate in to a full-blown civil war with the Arabs 
after the British occupation. 
It was also clear that the British did not have enough troops, equipment, and 
political support to sustain their presence, and further troop increases were not possible.  
The United Nations recommendation, in late 1947, to partition the country was 
unacceptable to the Arab population, causing further violence, which the British were 
unable to quell now that they had abandoned the strategy of engagement with the Jewish 
militias.   Thus, on December 11, 1947, the British announced the withdrawal of its 
forces and termination of its mandate in Palestine.266  In 1948, the Jewish Agency led by 
Ben-Gurion began to assume responsibility for the future Israeli government.  As the 
British departed, the Haganah filled the security and governance voids, while dismantling 
the Irgun and Stern Gang.  The Haganah military strategy shifted in preparation for the 
impending battles against Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding countries sympathetic to 
the Palestinian cause.  The change from low-level, small units mounting surprise attacks 
to more conventional, larger scale attack capabilities coincided with the transition from a 
militia force designed to defend the Yishuv to the Israeli Defense Force, which officially 
occurred on May 26, 1948. 
E. THE UNITED NATION STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT 
Between December 1947, when Britain announced that the termination of its 
Mandate of Palestine and May 1948 when it was to redeploy its troops, the United 
Nations Palestine Commission had to identify and implement an end state for Palestine.  
It concluded that the best solution was a partitioning the country between the Palestinian 
Arabs and the Jews.  Recognizing the success of the Jewish militias over the previous 
twenty years, the U.N. elected to employ indigenous militia forces as the primary security 
element for both new states.  On January 10, 1948, the U.N. published its report 
A/AC.21/W.9 outlining the responsibilities: 
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B.8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within 
the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of 
the state, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent 
frontier clashes. 
This armed militia is each State shall, for operational purposes be under 
the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general 
political and military control including the choice of the militias high 
command, shall be exercised by the Commission.267 
The British military was to “maintain law and order in the areas they had not yet 
evacuated” until such time as they were withdrawn.268 
The UN vision for security provision by militias was outlines by the Ralph 
Bunche, chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP):  
Something like that of the “Home Guard” in the United Kingdom, an 
armed force raised from the people in order to defend some villages, to 
defend their land and to supply something that is between an army and the 
police….but capable of dealing with large-scale internal disturbances and 
preventing frontier clashes and border attacks.  On these assumptions the 
successful execution by the armed militia of its tasks would require that it 
be a mobile force possessing sufficient equipment and training to enable it 
to defend the borders of each state and to cope with widespread disorders, 
guerilla attacks by organized bands and sabotage of public utilities.  In 
addition, it would be required to maintain proper control of disturbed 
areas, to protect life and property, to ensure the continued operation of 
essential public utilities, and safe communication and transport 
facilities.269 
The intent of this guidance was to allow Jewish militias to legally assume control 
of multiple security requirements that were no longer accepted by the British occupation, 
and which they had already successfully conducted in a clandestine form.  The British 
occupation of Palestine had required a static force that ranged from 60,000 to 100,000 
soldiers, “two divisions, an armoured brigade and air force units [and a] … police force 
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totaling some 32,000” personnel.270  The estimated strength of the Haganah in 1948 was 
40,000; the Jewish Settlement Police was approximately 16,000; the Palmach 
approximately 6,000; the Irgun ranged from 3,000 to 5,000; and the Stern Gang ranged 
between 200 and 300.271  However, it was already clear that the Haganah would absorb 
the Irgun and Stern Gang as a means of eliminating their radical activities that would 
possibly shift from attacking British forces to Palestinian Arabs.  In sum the U.N. 
recognized that the Jewish militias, with an estimated operating strength of nearly 66,000 
personnel who had been trained both legally and illegally during British occupation in all 
the tasks described in the General Assembly’s resolution, were capable of assuming 
security responsibilities.  In so doing, the Jewish militias allowed the British to 
completely withdraw their forces from Palestine while maintaining the security of the 
Jewish population.  The UN’s support for militias directly impacted the ability of the 
Jewish Agency and the Haganah establish a functional and professional standing army, 
the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) on May 28, 1948.  The IDF was also successful in 
dissolving the more radical Irgun and Stern Gang and absorbing their members into the 
IDF.272 
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Figure 10.   1947 United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine273 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
Despite the British forces’ failed effort to defeat the Jewish militias in the years 
immediately preceding Israeli independence, the military strategy of engaging local 
militia forces to work in conjunction with the occupying military between 1936 and 1945 
ultimately produced security forces to which British forces could hand responsibility for 
local and national security.  This allowed the occupying military to reduce its footprint as 
the local militia forces gain in strength and responsibility.  The Balfour Declaration 
committed the British government to a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which tended to 
reinforce the tactical strategy of engagement toward Jewish militias by the British 
military, at least until the de facto rejection of the principles of the Balfour Declaration by 
the Labour government in 1945.  Nevertheless, the relationship between the British 
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military and the militias was always complex.  Despite its refusal to recognize the 
Haganah officially, the British military realized its importance in providing security to 
the Jewish community; something that the British military was not always able to 
achieve.  Therefore, the description of the Haganah as “a semi-illegal underground militia 
with a limited operational spectrum and organizational structure” was vague enough for 
the British military to employ the Haganah when they were overwhelmed and to call for 
its dissolution when it was no longer needed.274  Thus, Haganah did not emerge as a 
capable, disciplined, fighting force because of overwhelming support from the British 
occupation forces.  Rather, it was to the advantage of British military strategies of 
acceptance and engagement employed by the British military to make itself into such a 
force.  As a result, the Jewish militias were able to force the withdrawal of British forces 
and establish a legitimate national defense force based on its long term strategy of 
community protection.  On the other hand, the Labour Party government’s decision to 
abandon engagement with militias and instead seek their defeat required it to increase 
troop levels to quell the rising levels of instability, which ultimately led to the decision to 
relinquish authority of Palestine to the United Nations.  The United Nations then reversed 
course, endorsing the use of militias as a legitimate security force.  The transformation of 
the Haganah into the Israeli Defense Force clearly shows that militias can evolve into a 
functional state security apparatus, under the right circumstances. 
                                                 
274  David Tal, “Between Intuition and Professionalism:  Israeli Military Leadership during the 1948 
Palestine War,” The Journal of Military History 68.3 (2004): 888. 
 95
IV. CONCLUSION 
The United States strategy towards militias in Iraq has been similar to the British 
strategy towards Jewish militias in Palestine from 1920-1947.  It has vacillated from one 
of disregard to one of dissolution to one of denial.  As Peter Galbraith pointed out, the 
Iraq strategy has faltered because “they are being made up as they go along, without the 
benefit of planning, adequate knowledge of the country, or the experience of comparable 
situations.”275  The British government and military also disagreed regarding the best 
approach to dealing with militias in Palestine.  The British government recognized the 
futility of employing a violent military solution to a political problem, whereas the 
military felt the use of overwhelming firepower was justified and necessary to defeat 
intransigent Jewish militias conducting guerrilla style attacks. 
Since post-invasion operations began in Iraq, the U.S. has emphasized a strategy 
of non-engagement towards militias with the ultimate hope of eliminating them in favor 
of the newly formed Iraq security forces.  This was underlined by Coalition Provisional 
Authority Order 91 which made militias illegal.  However closer examination of the U.S. 
relationships with Kurdish, Sunni and Shia militias reveal a biased approach toward 
engagement.  The U.S. has employed a strategy of engagement and has always 
maintained a positive relationship with the Kurdish Peshmerga, even prior to the invasion 
in 2003.  U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Sunni militias suddenly changed from defeat to 
engagement in 2006.  Thus, only in regard to the Shia militia has the U.S. actually 
implemented a strategic policy of non-engagement, often failing to distinguish Shia 
militias from insurgents.  This ethnically biased military strategy towards militias 
threatens the U.S. position as liberator of all Iraqis, and may make it more difficult to 
engage Shia militias if and when U.S. decision-makers decide to adopt a consistent 
strategy of engagement and cooperation. 
The evidence presented here clearly calls for such a comprehensive strategy.  
Engagement with Kurdish Peshmerga has led to stability and the transformation of the 
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militias into an effective security force, as government security forces continue to mature.  
In the Anbar province, U.S. military forces adopted a similar strategy in 2006 that began 
with the engagement of local sheiks and led to the employment of their militias to 
perform local security responsibilities alongside U.S. and Iraq security forces.  These 
engagements also led to an improved police force, due to an increase in recruits whom 
the locals trusted.  Improved cooperation between U.S. military, police and Sunni militias 
has made Anbar province one of safest areas in Iraq in 2007 after being considered by 
senior military officials as the most contentious area of Iraq in 2006.  However the U.S. 
remains committed to a non-engagement strategy vis-à-vis Shia militias.  And Moqtada al 
Sadr’s Mahdi Militia has continued to defy the occupation of Iraq by the U.S.  The 
evidence presented here suggests that isolation of the Mahdi Militia has and will continue 
to create greater instability for two reasons.  First, over the last three years, the U.S. 
military tactics aimed at defeating the Mahdi Militia through targeted raids against militia 
commanders has led to the unintended consequence of creating a power vacuum that has 
been filled by criminal’s intent upon making a personal profit regardless of how it will 
negatively impact the community.  This evidence also suggests that local communities 
suffer the consequences of reduced security because the nascent Iraqi security forces are 
still in the developmental stage and have yet to assume an independent role as a trusted 
security provider.  Therefore U.S. forces have been required to fill the role of security 
provider, leading to the troop surge of 2007.  However, U.S. planners have continuously 
recognized the inability of U.S. forces to sustain the troop surge beyond 2008.  They are 
at the breaking point.  It is unknown how much longer U.S. soldiers will be willing to 
redeploy to Iraq for their fourth, fifth, or sixth deployment that ranges from twelve to 
fifteen months.  Therefore, this strategy has the potential to create another power vacuum 
if Iraqi security forces have not demonstrated the ability to assume an independent role as 
sole security provider by then. 
The second problem resulting from the lack of engagement with Shia militias is 
the lack of oversight.  The evidence suggests that this has allowed an uninterrupted line 
of communication with other external actors that were willing to engage them.  Iran 
gladly accepted the role, co-opting as many Shia militias as possible and providing them 
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with training, funding, and equipment, which ironically has been used lethally to disrupt 
U.S. military operations in Iraq.  However, the likelihood of Shia militias turning to Iran 
and then attacking U.S. forces would have been lower if U.S. policy-makers had adopted 
a much more aggressive policy towards engaging moderate militia members and 
including them into the overall security plan after the ceasefire in October 2004.  The 
good news is that recent experience in Anbar Province suggests that it is still not too late 
to change course.  Sadr’s efforts to rehabilitate the Mahdi Militia during a six month 
cessation of attacks and General Petraeus’ encouraging response to Sadr’s decision also 
suggests that Shia militias would be willing to cooperate with the United States.  
However, the likelihood of Shia militias turning away from Iranian sponsors much the 
same way Sunni militias were inclined to turn away from al Qaeda will be greater if the 
incentives offered by the U.S. and Iraqi government were right for an alliance of 
convenience. 
A. THE BRITISH IN PALESTINE: A WAY FORWARD? 
The British experience in Palestine was strikingly similar to the U.S. experience 
in Iraq.  When studied chronologically the British strategy was virtually opposite that of 
the U.S.  From 1920 to 1936 the British strategy towards Jewish militias was rather 
complacent.  However, an Arab insurgency that began to foment in 1936 led military 
officials to pursue a strategy of engagement with militias through the establishment of 
constabulary forces known as the Jewish Settlement Police.  Serving alongside the British 
security forces, these forces were critical to the restoration of order by 1939 without the 
need for additional British military forces.  Although the White Paper of 1939 could have 
destroyed their symbiotic relationship, the onslaught of World War II that same year led 
moderate Jewish militia leaders to continue to support British military forces.  This 
greatly benefited the British less than a year later when Palestine was faced with the 
threat of invasion by Axis powers.  They turned again to the Haganah, which created a 
special commando unit known as the Palmach.  The Palmach were involved in a 
multitude of operations ranging from sabotage of enemy infrastructure, serving as 
navigators for allied forces in neighboring Syria and Lebanon, to repelling invading 
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forces long enough to allow British security forces retreat from Palestine safely while 
leaving the Jewish militias there to fend for themselves.  The British were subsequently 
able to acquire Haganah cooperation and assistance in a joint-campaign against more 
radical militias.  During these periods of engagement with the British, the Haganah 
developed professionally which was imperative for their transition from a militia to a 
professionally recognized force after the British departed.   
However, the Labour Party’s 1945 decision to uphold the MacDonald White 
Paper of 1939 mortally wounded the British relationship with the Haganah, ultimately 
requiring a major influx of British troops to maintain order.  Not only did the Haganah 
finally reject the British engagement strategy, it formed an alliance with the radical 
militias that had been hunted only months earlier.  As the security situation deteriorated, 
the British continually increased troop levels until they reached 100,000, one-tenth of 
their military.  This was unsustainable, and the British were never able reopen lines of 
communication with the Haganah or any other Jewish militia.  As a result, the security 
situation became so untenable that the British government was forced to turn the Mandate 
back over to the United Nations.  This evidence suggests that a 28 year occupation 
dissolved within two years of the British adoption of a political position that alienated the 
Jewish population, and a military policy of non-engagement and defeat vis-à-vis the 
Jewish militias. 
At the end of the day, a stable Israeli state was built upon the foundation of the 
militias anyway.  Following the unexpected hand-over of the Palestine Mandate by the 
British, the UN was forced to adopt a policy of engagement that would encourage the use 
of militias by both Arabs and Jews.  The UN did not possess the capability to provide 
administration, governance and security, which was desperately needed in the transition 
period.  Therefore it engaged Haganah.  Within six months the state of Israel was born, 
and the Haganah was transformed from an unofficial local militia to a professional 
standing army, which remains a formidable defense force sixty years later.  The Haganah 
could serve as a potential model in Iraq of how the U.S. could employ militias as a 
provincial defense force that could play a greater role in maintaining stability while 
reducing unsustainable troops levels that the U.S. is currently experiencing.  If the U.S. 
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strategy should involve the transition of security to a militia force then engagement needs 
to include different types of joint operations in order to evaluate and assess training, 
equipment and discipline standards – a process which took a decade in Palestine. 
B. SIMILARITIES REVEALED 
Four major similarities between British strategies and recent U.S. initiatives are 
already in evidence.  The first is the key role played by a small number of individual 
commanders who adopted a pragmatic course of action based on a critical analysis of the 
situation on the ground, which resulted in greater stability with fewer troops and mission 
accomplishment.  Major Orde Wingate considered creative ways of containing the rising 
Arab insurgency in Palestine, and was ultimately authorized to establish the Special 
Night Squads, which utilized indigenous militia forces and their expansive knowledge of 
the area instead of more British soldiers.  This led to an immediate defeat of insurgents 
responsible for the attacks, and helped prevent further sabotage of the Iraqi oil pipeline, 
which in turn helped stabilize the local economy.  Colonel MacFarland recognized the 
use of militias as security providers in Anbar province in order to augment U.S. forces in 
Anbar province and drive out al Qaeda insurgents.  This led to an immediate impact on 
an improved security situation that has also experienced an improvement in economic 
stability without the use of additional U.S. forces. 
The informal recognition of militia forces as local security providers is the second 
similarity.  In both cases, militia forces were not recognized as a legal source of security.  
Iraqi militias were considered antithetical to the Iraq’s national security plan.  Similarly, 
the British knew that Jewish militias existed but refused to recognize them and arrested 
known militia members.   
However, in both cases the occupation forces formalized their relationship with 
the militias when faced with insurgencies that they could not otherwise contain -- the 
Arab insurgency of 1936 in Palestine and the al Qaeda/Sunni insurgency in Anbar 
province in 2006.  The third similarity is the successful co-optation and use of militias in 
response to a rising insurgency and a shortage of occupation forces, essentially as a 
desperate stop gap measure.  The Arab insurgency that began in 1936 fundamentally 
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altered the British position in Palestine, while U.S. forces had nearly lost control of 
Anbar province to Sunni insurgents in 2006.  Both occupation forces employed local 
militias successfully to reduce violent attacks and increase stability of local 
neighborhoods.  The Jewish Settlement Police and the Anbar Awakening each increased 
local stability, forestalling a need to increase occupation troop levels for a long duration.  
In both cases, this policy reversal was facilitated by a renaming of militias.  Sunni 
militias became the Anbar Awakening, Concerned Local Citizens, and the Critical 
Infrastructure Guard Force, while Jewish militias became Special Night Squads, Jewish 
Settlement Police, and the Supernumerary force.  The organizations, sanctioned by the 
occupation forces, were staffed by the very militias they had refused to recognize 
previously.   
The fourth similarity involves the employment of militias during conventional 
operations.  In both cases, militias became an important element in the overall military 
plan.  In Iraq, the Kurdish Peshmerga was paramount in United States ability to defeat 
Saddam Hussein’s forces in Northern Iraq.  Alongside U.S. Special Forces troops, the 
Peshmerga was the main (indeed the only force) employed by U.S. military planners.  
The successful engagement of the Kurdish Peshmerga not only led to the defeat of Iraqi 
forces in the north but also contributed to the initial destruction of Ansar al Islam, a 
powerful insurgency that later would regroup and attempt to impact U.S. military 
operations during the occupation.  The evidence clearly suggests that Ansar al Islam 
would have had a much greater impact on the U.S. military occupation of Iraq if the 
Special Forces and Peshmerga had not eliminated their initial base of operation during 
the invasion of Iraq.  British forces had similarly turned to Jewish militias in Palestine 
when faced with the threat of invasion from Axis powers during World War II.   Already 
facing a shortage of troops, the British were unable to successfully defend Palestine from 
a German invasion unassisted.  Therefore, they sanctioned the Palmach (elite Jewish 
militia force) derived from the “technically illegal” Haganah.  Supported by British 
training and funding, the Palmach would later serve as guides for allied armies and 
perform secret missions behind enemy lines.  However, the clearest example of British 
need for militia support was the planned defense of Palestine by Jewish militias against 
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an invading Axis army, which would have allowed British occupation forces to retreat 
safely.  If Palestine had been occupied by an Axis military, Britain’s plan called for 
Jewish militias to continue their resistance through the use of unconventional, guerilla 
tactics until the British military was capable of reinforcing them.   
C. AVENUES OF FUTURE RESEARCH 
While the evidence presented here suggests that a military strategy of engaging is 
likely to be an efficacious security and stability strategy in Iraq, there are other aspects of 
the question that require further study.  In the long-term security realm, the integration of 
militias into the national security architecture presents the possibility of segregating the 
country along sectarian lines, if the government is unable to negotiate a relationship of 
cooperation that will benefit both militia and government.  Thus, the engagement of 
militias by U.S. forces could engender a federalized system established along sectarian 
lines, which could have serious political and security implications. 
On the other hand, if U.S. policy succeeds in establishing a democratic regime in 
Iraq, this will necessarily mean the political dominance of the Shia population.  
Numerically, Iraq is home to approximately 14 million Shia, which represents sixty 
percent of the population.  Iraqi democracy would therefore rest upon the traditions, 
values and cultures of the Shia.  Militias have traditionally been part of their social 
organization since the revolts against British occupation in the 1920s, as they have been 
for the Kurds and Sunnis of Iraq.   
If instead Iraq’s government adopts a galvanizing strategy that alienates the non-
Shia population, the political atmosphere will not be much different from Saddam 
Hussein’s sultanistic regime. To maintain stability, the government will be forced to 
emphasize coercion rather than consensus, and local autonomy will be limited.  However, 
in these circumstances militias are likely to continue to play a political and security role. 
Iraqi politics has long been based on central government negotiation with local 
strongmen, which results in a greater emphasis on services rendered at the local level by 
organized groups like militias. 
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Defeating conventional military forces in a traditional combat scenario is 
impossible for militias.  The Mahdi Army attempted to defeat the Coalition during 
multiple uprisings in Najaf and Sadr City in the 2004 and was tactically defeated.  
However, unlike conventional forces militias can switch back and forth between 
conducting military operations and assuming the role of victim in order to gain popular 
political support.  As Tartar notes, whereas “armed civilians are people without long-term 
political goals who seek only to free themselves from a foreign oppressor…militias like 
al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army [are] operated by militants who are committed to the political 
goals of the group.”276  This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
D. IN CLOSING: A WORD ABOUT WORDS 
There is a compelling need to redefine the term militia, freeing it of the negative 
connotations it has been given in the media and military and policy circles since 2003, to 
facilitate objective analysis in general, and of future U.S. policy options in particular.  
During the course of Iraqi occupation, the term militia has often been used to describe 
criminals, radical extremists, and insurgents.  Militias have always been a part of Iraq’s 
culture and performed valuable security and social services for their neighborhoods.  
Militias in Iraq are most accurately defined as “small homegrown, paramilitary-style 
brigades being formed by local tribes, religious leaders and political parties,” which 
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